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1. INTRODUCTION
More and more, flight safety is being emphasized by regulatory bodiesas well as
the airlines themselves. Despite the fact that the number of aircraft accidents,over the last
ten years, have continued to decline, the rate of improvement in air safety has slowed
somewhat in the same period. As a matter of interest, 1992 appears to have been theworst
year for airline accidents for the last decade. Various agencies besides aircraft
manufacturers have compiled airline accident statistics over the last several decades and,
with slight discrepancies, there appears to be strong agreement as to their primarycause.
One such source listed causal factors for air carrier accidents as shown in Table 1.
Table 1Causal factors for air carrier accidents, 1959-1990 with 1981-1990 data in
parenthesis.
Probable Cause % of Total Accidents
Pilot Error 65.2(60.4)
Airplane 16.4(15.0)
Maintenance 2.8(3.4)
Weather 4.5(4.3)
Airport/ATC 4.9(5.8)
Misc. 6.2(11.1)
Source: Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Aircraft Accidents, Worldwide
Operations 1959-1990. Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. p. 14.2
Rouse & Rouse (1983), Chambers & Nagel (1983)and O'Hare & Roscoe (1990)
give estimates of accidents due to piloterror varying from 60 % to 90 % of all accidents.
Advances in aviation technology have made the aircrafta very reliable machine, with well
over half the total accidents being caused by the human element. The problem of 'pilot
error' is fairly complex in nature and,as yet, no comprehensive model of 'pilot error'
exists. There are several reasons for this. First, research intohuman behavior is not quite
as advanced as the physical phenomena (Nagel, 1988). Second, aircraft accidentsare
usually catastrophic in nature, resulting in insufficient evidence,during accident
investigation, to draw a complete picture of the cause(s) of theerrors (as distinct from the
causes of the accident). Third, the threat of litigation and punishment associated with
accident investigation makes it difficult for the parties involvedto be honest in their
testimonies. This means that the reports received from the flightcrew after the accident
(were they to survive it) are sometimes not reliable. Since thecockpit crew is the one
involved in getting the airplane from departure to arrival, eventualblame is laid squarely at
their door.
Flying a modern airliner is no longer a tedious task requiringa multitude of crew-
members with special expertise in diverse fields. In the industry'sdauntless quest to
automate almost every aspect of flying and controlling the aircraft,progress in automation
has reached a point that relegates the pilots to the role of monitors,at best, a tedious
function to which people are ill suited. Even the presently toutednew technology, such as
the glass cockpit and fly-by-wire designs bring along associatednew problems. Impaired
by boredom, a monotonous environment and coupled with fatigue, theeffects of lengthy
monitoring duties finally reveal themselvesas in-flight incidents and, in extreme cases, as
accidents.
Airplanes operate in a complex systems environment. On the flightdeck of a
modern airliner, the flight crew has an array of instruments giving vitalinformation on the
aircraft's ever-changing state. All of this information hasto be assimilated and integrated in3
a coherent way such that safe execution of maneuvers can be accomplished. The flight
crew must be seen as system integrators working within a larger system, comprising
ground control and national airspace control. However, the principal responsibility for
integrating all this information and execution of subsequent actions rests with the captain,
who functions as a systems manager on the flight deck of this multi-tasking and dynamic
environment.
There are a number of problems associated with the proper assimilation of all the
relayed information and their translation into correct and timely responses. Part of the
problem may be attributed to the "one-box-at-a-time" (Wiener, 1987) device installation in
cockpits. The make and models of the various instruments and their display techniques
vary by the manufacturers. This leaves the crew with the job of decoding and integrating
all the different instrument displays, which detracts from their primary task of flying the
aircraft. This "one-box-at-a-time" problem is now being addressed by the concept of the
"fully integrated cockpit" where avionics manufacturers are doing the integrating and
providing the flight-crew with only the necessary information in normal flightor to take-
over automation, with varying levels of control, during an emergency.
Assimilation and translation of all the information displays are carried out by
several of the processing modes in humans. Failure of one of the several information
processing modes (comprising visual, tactile, auditory and sensory modes) on the part of
the flight crew, even for a momentary period, may cause a sudden overloading of the other
modes to create a critical condition for errors to be committed. Nearly a third of all airline
accidents in the past several decades has been due to procedural errors i.e. non-compliance
with standard operating procedures by the flight crews (Nagel, 1988). These non-standard
operating procedures reveal themselves as incidents or, where the results aremore serious,
as accidents. Complete elimination of these errors would be difficult to achieve within a
short time; a more realistic near-term goal would be a substantial reduction of these
procedural errors (Nagel, 1988). Indeed, the focus of accident investigative reports and4
recommendations should be on making flight-crews aware of themany failure modes that
are possible (and which result in incidents and accidents) such that they become aware of
the phenomena and will be better equipped to deal with them when they arise.
Several categories of aircraft accidents involving operational and human factorsare
subsets of populations of incidents that contain the same elements (Billings & Reynard,
1984). Since procedural errors account for over one-third of all the accidents (Sears,
1986), it is therefore important to gain an understanding of the tasks involved in the cockpit
environment and thereby understand the process that led up to the reasons for the
deviations and, ultimately, errors being committed. Sears (1986) compiled airline accident
statistics over a twenty-four year period, from 1959 to 1983, comprising 93 major
accidents (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1Significant Accident Causes and Percentage Present in 93 Major Accidents
(1959-1983)
Cause of Accident Presence (%)
Pilot deviated from basic operational procedures 33
Inadequate cross-check by second crew member 26
Design Faults 13
Maintenance & inspection deficiencies 12
Absence of approach guidance 10
Captain ignored crew inputs 10
Air Traffic Control failures 9
Improper crew response during abnormal conditions 9
Insufficient or incorrect weather information 8
Runway hazards 7
Air Traffic Control/crew communication deficiencies 6
Improper decision to land 6
Source: Human Factors in Aviation. Academic Press 1988. David Nagel & Earl Wiener5
The most recent data on aircraft accidents that resulted from controlled flight into
terrain, or CFIT's, is depicted in Figure 1.1. This shows that in 1992, 706 peoplewere
killed in 21 CFIT'sthe second highest total in the last ten years. CFIT accidentsare the
most avoidable of all regular categories of accidents describing a particular type of aircraft
collision with the ground. CFIT accidents were not related to aircrafttypes but to two
major causes - weather and crew distraction. Theuse of the term "controlled" in CFIT
accidents is unfortunate because it could be interpreted to imply pilot intent. Whatit really
means is that the aircraft had no technical problems which would have caused the accident
anyway and that the pilot was in full control of the airplane at the time of impact with the
ground. The term implies that the pilot was unaware of the impending impactor realized
too late to prevent it.
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Figure 1.1Number of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents resulting in
fatalities during the last ten years. Source: Flight International, Jan. 27 1993.6
Figure 1.2 depicts the part, in the flight phase (bypercentage of accidents), where most of
the accidents had occurred. Almost half of the accidents tookplace in the latter stages of
the flight, beginning with the approach (to land) phase. Despiteaccounting for almost fifty
per cent of all accidents, this flight phase accounted for only 4% of the entire flight
duration.
Clearly, there was a need for a model to classify theseerrors in order to trace the
origins of these errors that led up to the accidents. Classification oferrors itself, while
being useful in gaining an overall perspective, did not reveal whycrews failed to follow
standard operating procedures.
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Fig. 1.2 Percentage of Accidents by flight-phase basedon an average flight duration of
1.6 hours.Source: Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Aircraft Accidents, Worldwide
Operations 1959-1990. Boeing Commercial Airplane Group.p. 13.
It is also appropriate to talk of causal factors ofan accident rather than the cause,
since accidents and incidents were normally the result ofa chain of events with a probable7
cause (primary) supported by causal factors (contributory)1.Nevertheless, one thing is
clear: errors (especially procedural errors) that lead to accidentsare neither random nor
mysterious. It has been said that there are no new types of aircraft accidents, onlypeople
with short memories. In many of these cases, the incidents and accidentswere
foreshadowed by clear evidence that the problems existed long before (Barlay,1990). An
operational incident, once incurred, would signal the possibility ofan impending accident;
with a repeat of the same incident, the possibility would then becomea probability. Sheer
repetitions of the same mistakes should have drawn attention to themselves andrevealed
their causes such that preventive measures could have been taken (Barlay, 1990).
However, public attention is generally focused on airline safety issues only when accidents
happen.
1.1Cockpit Task Management (CTM)
Much has been done in the field of optimizing availableresources in the cockpit.
Cockpit Resource Management is a concept that is widely accepted bymost major airlines
and focuses on crew resource optimization on the flight deck ofan aircraft; resources that
include both equipment and the physical resources of thecrew. The drawback of CRM is
that its focus is on very broad issues relate chiefly to the sociologicalaspects of crew
behavior. It includes personality, crew compatibility, coordination and communicationand
other aspects of team building issues. What is lacking is a focuson the tasks that the crews
engage in on a continual basis and whose execution results in errors that lead to incidents
and accidents. Cockpit Task Management (CTM) is a term used to describe theprocess that
crews use to prioritize, allocate resources, initiate and terminate multiple concurrent tasks
(Funk, 1991). CTM focuses specifically on cockpit tasks and theirmanagement by the
1 The Canadian Air Safety Board (CASB)reports accidents in this manner, with a probable cause which was later
changed to 'cause related findings' and 'related findings'. The German system reports accidentsas findings' and
'list of chain events' which leaves it to the reader to interpret as desired. The U.S. system sticks to demandinga
probable cause' (and naming it if possible) and getting the report out inside twelve months.8
crew. CTM offers a way to analyze incidents (and accidents) using anerror taxonomy that
categorizes specific task errors such that rootcauses for the error committal can be
identified. It must be noted, however, that CTM offersone (of several) perspectives of
looking at task management errors.
1.2Research Objectives
The principal objective of this thesis was to determine the significance of CTM
errors with respect to flight safety and to develop a structured method of error classification
to account for all the task management errors committed in the cockpit ofa modem airliner.
The basis for the research came from earlier workon CTM errors (Chou, 1991) and
a collection of ASRS incident reports. While the work of Chou dealt primarily with NTSB
accident data (with a little ASRS incident analysis), the bulk of this thesiswas based on
ASRS incident reports dated between 1987 and 1993.In particular, the original error
taxonomy of Chou and Funk (1990)was revised extensively and a method of classifying
the errors, more rigorously, is presented. By adding structureto the methodology of
classifying these errors, I hope to enable other researchers studying thesame incident
reports to arrive at the same error classification. The attempt was to have a coherentsystem
that could be applied to every incident report to obtain consistent results. Itmust be noted
however, that the methodology was not validated by any other researcheror individual.
Having thus determined the significance of CTMerrors and having classified them,
some recommendations were developed for the design of procedures and equipment that
would contribute to mitigating those task managementerrors and thereby improving flight
safety.9
1.3Overview
An overview of this study and the organization of the investigation isas follows.
Chapter 2 gives some background information on humanerror studies methodology and
discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach. There is alsoa
discussion on both earlier and more recent research into humanerror models by several
leading investigators in this area. An introduction to the concepts of CockpitResource
Management (CRM) and Cockpit Task Management (CTM) is also given in this chapter
which is discussed further in Chapter 3. An introduction to the earlier CTMerror
taxonomy is given. The research objectives are also outlined. Chapter 2 also introduces
the fundamentals in a task transition process and its relation to CTMerrors. Chapter 3
discusses error classification schemes in general and, in particular, discusses theerror
classification methodology used. The original error taxonomywas modified in the light of
the research into the 470 ASRS incident reports. The error classification methodology is
discussed with definitions and supported by four examples of reported incidents in each
classified error category. Chapter 4 deals primarily with the results of the report analyses.
The results of the analyses were tabulated and summarized. Chapter 5 isa discussion of
the results of the research. Specific error categories are discussed with respect to the actual
task management errors committed in each of those specific categories. In Chapter 6an
attempt was made to link some of the specific task management errors to certain human
cognitive failures. Chapter 7 provides some conclusions and recommendationsto mitigate
these errors.2. BACKGROUND
2. 1Introduction
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There are a number of ways in which human error studies have been conducted.
Nagel (1988) identified four different methods. First, there is direct observation, wherethe
observer watched the flight crew perform their duties on the flight deck and noted his
observations. There were a couple of drawbacks to this approach. The mainone was that
the presence of the observer could alter the behavior of the observed. The secondwas that
the observer himself could make observation errors; this implied that the observer should
be very familiar with the pilots' duties. Curry (1985) and Wiener (1985), both pilots and
human factors professionals, had applied this method very successfully in their studies of
flight crew performance.
The second approach is to study accident data. The drawback here is that although
the probable cause of the accidents could be identified, the reasons for theerrors leading to
the accident could be difficult to establish since the leading witnesses, in mostcases, perish
in the accidents.
The third method involves the study of aircraft incident reports. In the U.S., the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) represents a collection of self-reports (provided
by aircraft flight crew and Air Traffic Control personnel) on aircraft incidents. One
important aspect of the system is that the reporters are given some degree of confidentiality
and immunity from prosecution. The drawback however, is that these reportsare not
random; often, safety-minded people report more often or some recent incidence of
accidents or legislation may prompt more reports to be submitted. However, the added
advantage (from a human factors perspective) is that it is possible to performa call-back
interview with the reporter to find out what caused the error to happen and the
circumstances under which it was committed. Data from the ASRS database caused
hundreds of "alert bulletins" to be issued to appropriate agencies that resulted ina variety of11
actions that have themselves had measurable effectson aviation safety in the United States
(Nagel, 1988). Table 2.1 shows the percentage of ASRS incidentreports that reflect pilot
and controller error.
Table 2.1Frequency Distribution of ASRS reports by Problem Origin
Problem Origin % of reports received
Air Traffic Control 40
Flight Crew 41
Aircraft/subsystem 3
Airport/subsystem 4
Publications/procedures 2
Other
100
Source: Human Factors in Aviation. Academic Press 1988. David Nagel & Earl Wiener
The fourth method of error studies is to study errors in laboratories and simulators.
This is a relatively simple method of error study since a number of the complex conditions
(that would be present in the real environment) can be filtered outso as not to obfuscate the
research. The drawback, of course, is that this clinical approach does not accurately
represent real-world conditions. Ruffel Smith (1971), however, showed that accurate
reproduction of operational conditions via afull mission flight simulation could bea valid
model using this methodology.
For this research, the third method study of incident data- was utilized. Incidents
are really accidents that did not occur and the reports provided ample evidence of repeated
task management errors made by flight crew. Incident analyses,as it became apparent,
revealed the specific areas of the flight regime where errorswere committed with more
frequency than others, including the actual task management error committed by the flight
crew. It was possible, at the end of the research, to see very obvious areas of task12
management problems and provide recommendations for mitigating them. Another
advantage of the incident review technique is that it provides the basis to devisea structured
call-back questionnaire i.e. asking the right questions (of the reporter) to providean
accurate historical record of events preceding the error committal. One of the drawbacks
with the current callback technique used by ASRS, was that the callback reviewdid not go
back far enough to give a better historical record of preceding events that eventuallyled up
to the incident.
2.2Human Error Analysis Models
Investigative studies and formal research into the subject of humanerror is
not new. The fact that human errors are the principal cause of aircraft accidents served to
initiate early research into human error studies. A brief overview of existing modelson
human error by leading researchers in this field is given as background information.
Human behavior is a complex subject more so if the human is a captainat the
controls of a modem airliner. With a multitude of tasks (each demandingsome measure of
his attention at some time or another) and a flight crew and Air Traffic Controlto manage,
an accurate portrayal of his behavior under such workload would be difficult to simulate.
As such, no model of pilot error exists that satisfactorily and comprehensively
accounts for all errors committed on the flight deck. A number of theories based on a
general approach to error classification (Rouse & Rouse, 1983) and single-task human
performance (Rouse, 1981) have been adduced. Other models based on behavior-oriented
schemes that emphasize basic human information processing capabilities have been
adduced, notably the models of Norman (1981) and Rasmussen (1983). Parasuraman
(1987), who studied user interaction with automated monitoring systems where
information is displayed at rapid rates and dynamically updated, concludes that human
monitoring performance can be sub-optimal as a result of lowered vigilance. At the other
extreme, Taylor (1981), who studied car drivers, argues that safety is hard to improve13
beyond a certain limit. He stated that drivers tend to keep their arousal ata desired,
constant level, and consequently if conditions become too undemanding, will go faster to
generate more arousing incidents (Taylor 1981). It appears, if Taylor is right, that the
reason for accidents may be an intention to take risks. In fact Taylor (1981) criticizes the
"mechanistic" accident investigation of causes rather than the reasons. Reasonsare seen as
conditioning elements (prior to error commitment) while causes relate to a course of events
(after error is committed). In aviation, each plays a role simultaneously and it would be
pointless trying to distinguish between the two.
Models of dual task performance of humans, using Multiple Resource Theory
(Wickens & Flach, 1988 ), extended to cover multiple task environments have also been
investigated. The information-processing model of human performance (Card, Moran &
Newell, 1983) is an information-decision-action model that asserts that cockpit behavior is
a three-stage process. The acquisition, exchange and processing of information is the key
activity in the first stage; decision-making with specific intents and plans to act marks the
second stage while implementation marks the final stage. The Billings and Reynard model
(1984) also has categories that reflect information transfer problems in aircraft.
2.3Cockpit Resource Management (CRM)
Almost all of the error models discussed above started out as general error models
or single-task and dual-task performance models that were extended and applied to the
multi-tasking cockpit environment. These generalized models, while they provide a better
understanding of the kinds of errors committed on the flight deck, do not focus on the
specific tasks involved in the various phases of flight. This is somewhat akin to a student
going for an examination with a head full of general answers looking for question
categories to fit them into. This generalization, in part, has resulted in the concept of
cockpit resource management (CRM). The subject of cockpit resource management,
showing a close relationship between pilot workload and errors in vigilance and decisions,14
has been documented in simulator studies (Ruffel Smith, 1979). Lauber (1986) defines
CRM as "..the effective utilization of all available resources-hardware, software and
liveware...to achieve safe, efficient flight operations". This is a catch-all concept that
includes all possible combinations of human factors as well as theoretical and applied
psychological aspects of human behavior. What is needed then, is a model that accurately
characterizes the specific tasks the crews engage in, such that the establishment ofmeasures
and standards (a problem with CRM) are facilitated.
2.4cockpit Task Management (CM
Much of the focus in crew training of the major airlines is on flight crew
performance as a team in the cockpit environment. Issues such as crew coordination, team-
building, and other such issues on social dynamics are being emphasized. In all of these
efforts, there was very little attempt to focus on the specific tasks that crews engaged in and
the techniques employed for their successful execution. In particular, the subject of how
crews went about prioritizing tasks, allocating the necessary mental and physical resources
required for the task execution had hardly been addressed at all. What was unusualwas
that, when the ASRS incident reports were analyzed, there were numerous situations where
the flight crew committed un-forced errors in carrying out routine taskstasks for which
there were specific guidelines in their Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) handbook for
managing them. The traditional approach to dealing with task management errors by
focusing on the social aspects of crew interaction and their coordination appeared to be
missing the point. The approach adopted in this study could be termed a "bottoms-up"
approach where errors were looked at and projected backwards to uncover the trigger
events that led up to the error committal and then ways to mitigate those errors were
sought. This study focused specifically on cockpit taskstheir management (or mis-
management) by the crews and aimed, as a first step, at developing a structured method of
classifying these errors.15
Cockpit Task Management (CTM) is a concept used to describe theprocess that
flight crews use to prioritize, initiate, execute and terminate multipleconcurrent tasks
(Funk, 1991). It is a multi-step procedure that consists of mission goals,a series of tasks
to achieve those goals, a method of prioritizing those tasks and sequencing their execution,
a method of allocating resources to those prioritized activities, a method of revising and
continually updating the sequence and priority level of those tasks anda method of
terminating those tasks.
Since goal fulfillment is the basis of all cockpit tasks, it offersa starting point for
understanding CTM concepts. A goal for a system is defined bya set of desired behaviors
and if any one of the behaviors is exhibited by the system, the goal is achieved (Funk,
1991). The use of the term goal is generic and actuallycovers higher level goals (super-
goals), mid-level goals (goals) and lower-level goals (sub-goals). Funk's partial flight
agenda (Fig. 2.4) shows the various elements of the hierarchy. An example ofa supergoal
would be the safe arrival at the destination airport.
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In CTM, a task is defined asa process that is completed to cause a system to
achieve a goal (Funk). Funk further identifiesan initial event (trigger event) that defines
the conditions under which the goal becomesrelevant and a terminal event that signals the
end of that goal pursuit. For an aircraft starting itsdescent phase, the initial event is the
distance to airfield (100 nm in Fig. 1.3). This trigger alsosignifies the terminal event for
the cruise phase (the preceding goal). Hence, thereare numerous sub-goals in most of the
preceding goals. Taxiing for take-off (initialevent doors locked) is one of the several
tasks carried out to satisfy the next goal- ready for take-off.
2.5Task Transition Process
A task, under normal circumstances, could beseen to be in one of the several states
as depicted in Figure 2.5. Initially, a task is seen to be pending untilan initial event occurs.
For example, just prior to being establishedon the approach phase (task pending), the
initial event, 20 nm from the field is reached (task active)until a terminal event (the Outer
Marker, say) is reached.
Pending )initial event (
Occurs
resources withdrawn from terminated task
and re-allocated
resour
all
rces
-allocated
goal achieved
or terminated
Figure 2.5Transition stages of tasks17
Pending tasks become active, in time, which means that they are no longer dormant
but will be acted upon at short notice. Active in-progress tasks are distinguished from
active tasks in that, the former will have mental resources allocated to them and are being
acted upon (attention, actions or decisions taken) by one or more crew members. In
addition, active tasks have a greater degree of immediacy attached to them which implies
that they will be made active-in-progress in a very brief time period. An aircrafton short
finals will have a number of active in-progress tasks going on concurrently. An example of
an active task here is the instrument scan. The crew switches their attention for a sweep of
the instruments from time to time to make this task active in-progress (very briefly) and it
(the scan) returns to the active state, time and again (much the same way asa motorist
switches his view from the road ahead to the rear-view mirror from time to time). In the
case of multiple tasks, as is the case during an approach, the most immediate task (already
prioritized before-hand) is attended to first and, as time goes on, resources withdrawn from
it (terminal event reached) and re-allocated (to next, immediate task) relative to the degree of
its goal fulfillment (goal fulfilled, re-prioritized or aborted). Additionally, any of the
transitions may be reversed or re-ordered at any point in time.
The task transition process can be better understood if it is applied to an actual
scenario involving a particular flight phase. Figure 2.6 depicts the case of an aircraft on
short finals and identifies some of the tasks that are pending, active and terminated at the
various phases of the approach.
Note that there is another category of a task stage (latent) that does not generally
appear on the agenda but is always present in the background that can be transitioned to, at
a moment's notice.18
Emergency Procedures- Latent throughout flight phases
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Figure 2.6Task transitions in the approach phase
Threshold
This is the latent stage and it comprises all the non-routine procedures (not included
in the flight plan), such as for fires or explosions on board, equipment malfunctions,
lightning strikes or bird strikes, weather and other such non-planned changes to the flight
plan. While being non-routine, these are all tasks that the crew is equipped to handle (and
can be evoked- made active and active in-progress) at any stage of the flight.
The final approach itself, in the earlier example, could be brokenup to a more
detailed analysis to reflect the actual case with more sub-goals. In thiscase the approach
could be categorized into long finals, short finals, flare and land. The aircraft is deemedto
be on short finals as soon as it captures the localizer and/or glide slope (initial event) inan
Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach. Approach is continued until each of the19
markers, comprising the outer and middle markers, is crossed (Figure2.7). The aircraft
has specific height clearances it has to maintain at each of these markers anda continuous
check is made of aircraft attitude, height, speed, throttle settings and trimadjustments until
the inner marker is reached (terminal event approach phase and initiatingevent- land
phase) when the aircraft is leveled and gradually flared for manual landing. Asthe flight
progresses, there may be several transitions going on between the different stages (for each
of the several tasks) as sub-goals are fulfilled and tasksare re-prioritized. It is also
important to remember that there may be, at any one time, several tasks thatare pending
which may (or may not yet) have been prioritized andresources re-allocated.
In all the task related activities (prioritizing, allocating and de-allocatingresources,
initiating and terminating) discussed above, one thing standsout as a common denominator
satisfactory task performance is limited by resource availability. When thereare several
tasks competing for the same resource (example, on finals tracking the ILS, watchingfor
traffic and ATC communication to manage) the tendency to commitmore resources than
necessary to one task (both crew members looking out for traffic, say) might result in the
poor or non-performance of another task (ATC communication, say). This happenedon
numerous occasions in the incident reports.Emergency Procedures (fire, explosion, bird/lightning strikes, wind shear, missed approach etc)Latent throughout flight
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2.6CTM Errors
The flight deck of the airliner is avery regimented one where almost every task,
pertinent to the safe flight of the aircraft, is carried out in accordance withStandard
Operating Procedures (SOP's) or in accordance to specific instructions fromAir Traffic
Control (ATC). In spite of this, errors can (and do)occur at any point in the task transition
process. The flight crew has to maintain a dynamic mental record of each of the transition
stages and the associated tasks that go with each phase as the aircraft makes rapidprogress
towards the threshold. These transitions are very rapid and thecrew may be engaged in
several task prioritization, resource allocation and de-allocation, taskinitiation and task
termination activities. The need for greatestcrew concentration appears to be at the
approach phase where, besides all the internal activities that keep the planein the air until
touchdown, there is a need to maintain ATC communication and alsoto maintain a traffic
watch outside the cockpit. In the research of the ASRS incidentreports, there were
numerous cases of pilots forgetting to operate certain controls at the designated points in the
approach, either because they were all concentratingon the traffic outside or trying to
maintain straight-and-level flight in bad weather. Thiswas more obvious at busy airports,
airports with more than one active runway and at locations with two airfields locatedclose
to one another. In a number of incidents, the crews were overwhelmed by the sheer
workload at these airports and forgot to obtain landing clearances, resulting inun-
authorized landings.
While behavioral psychologists tend to approach human performance (and hence
account for their errors) in terms of behavioral models, Rasmussen (1985), pointedout that
human performance could not be studied independent of task characteristics.In other
words, human reliability and performance dependedon a model of successful or normal
task performance and not on a model of human behavior. This appearedto be valid, since
error frequencies from incident reports would be dependent upon task characteristics and
the opportunity for operators to detect and correct the errors immediately. Further,as22
Rasmussen pointed out, human reliability predictionfollows the format of industrial
technical reliability analysis where thesystem components are broken down and data
analyzed for the individual components;operator activities are decomposed into elementary
task units and reliability data obtained interms of error rates. This followed the Tayloristic
tradition of studies based only on observable categoriesof operator activities. Given the
strictly procedural environment of the modern airline cockpit,where each phase of the
flight plan consists of specific sets of activities, itbecomes possible to analyze flightcrew
performance for the entire flight by decomposing themany tasks into corresponding error
categories.
As opposed to most normal operating environments, theflight deck of a modern
airliner is a regimented one. Every action and reaction of theflight crew is in strict
accordance with standard operating procedures (SOP). The majorityvote does not
determine headings to be flown, radio frequenciesto be selected, altitudes to cruise or
holding patterns to be deployed. Eachstage of the flight has its own pre-determinedcourse
of actions. Even emergencies were handled procedurally.Despite the procedural nature of
the operating environment, task managementerrors are routinely committed by experienced
flight crews. The problem is that thereare usually multiple, concurrent tasks to be
performed. These require some strategies,on the part of the crew, by which to evaluate
tasks, sequence them in order of priority, execute and/or terminatethem.
This regimented environment therefore, providesa basis to perform an error
analysis specific to cockpit tasks only. The concept of CockpitTask Management (CTM)
was first adduced by Funk (1991) and was an attempt to "..formalize theprocess that flight
crews use to initiate, monitor, prioritize, execute, and terminate multiple,concurrent tasks".
The emphasis in CTM, therefore, ison the crew's ability to manage multiple, concurrent
tasks with limited resources.
The most significant difference between CRM and CTMis that, in CRM the cockpit
(layout and displays) is consideredas a constant and modifications are made to crew23
behavior to find an optimal fit into the cockpit (Funk, 1991). In CTM, the cockpitis not
considered as a given i.e. the cockpit is alsoa variable that lends itself to modification.
Lauber's definition implies that CRM is rather broad inscope and deals mostly with
social interaction between flight-deck members, their activity coordinationand general
cockpit management. CTM is more focused and refers only to tasks in the cockpittheir
assessment, prioritization, execution and monitoring.
Yet another difference between CRM and CTM, is that the origins ofCTM and
CRM are different (Funk, 1991). CRM had its origins in the principles oforganizational
psychology and business management whereas CTM emerged fromconcepts of systems
theory and cognitive psychology, specifically time-sharing and workload.
Despite these differences however, it must be noted that CTM isan integral subset
of CRM but significant enough for it to be addressed distinctively rather thanglossed over,
as is the current practice.
2.7Earlier CTM Research
One of the objectives of original CTM studieswas to classify cockpit tasks and
identify CTM errors in the environment of a modern airliner. Thetwo main sources of
information for this research were National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)accident
reports (forming the bulk of the analyses) and, to a lesser extent, Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) incident reports. Funk (1990, 1991), Chou and Funk (1990) andChou
(1991) were responsible for the development of the firsterror classification taxonomy
specifically to address cockpit task managementerrors. Their model is summarized in
Table 2.7.24
Table 2.7 CTM Error Taxonomy (Chou and Funk,1990)
General Level Specific Level
Task Initiation
Early
Late
Incorrect
Lack
Task Monitoring Lack
Excessive
Task Prioritization High
Low
Resource Allocation High
Low
Task Interruption Incorrect
Task Resumption
Early
Late
Task Termination
Early
Late
Incorrect
Lack
2.8Research Objectives
Chou's 1991 study of CTM errors hada couple of limitations. First, the taxonomy
was used primarily to deal with NTSB accident reports. These reportswere readily
available and there was also an attempt to classifysome ASRS incident reports. The
Industrial Engineering department had in its possessionsome ASRS reports and Chou did
some preliminary analyses on these reports. The primary focus howeverwas on NTSB
accident reports.25
Second, the error taxonomy itself was not fully addressed.In particular, the error
classification methodology and justifications for the variouserror categories were not
discussed in detail.
This research built on the earlier work of Chou and Funk (1990, 1991) and, in
particular, established Cockpit Task Management (CTM) asa concept that was significant
enough to justify treatment as an important component of Cockpit Resource Management
(CRM). It was based upon the normative CTM error taxonomy developed by Funk (1990,
1991) and Chou (1991) and was applied to a much larger andmore complete collection of
ASRS airline incident reports.
One of the primary objectives of this research, with a significantly larger database
of incident reports to analyze, was to determine the significance of CTMerrors in reported
airline incidents using the original CTM taxonomy. Having thus determined their
significance, the next objective was to develop a structured methodology of classifying the
CTM errors such that it could be applied to any incident to yield consistent results. The
taxonomy itself was to be validated by the incident reports and refinements made to it in the
light of the research. In addition, an attempt was made to relate the specific CTMerrors to
human cognitive limitations.
The overall objective of this research then, was to determine the significance of
CTM errors with respect to flight safety, arrive at a consistent error classification
methodology, and develop recommendations for the design of procedures and equipment
that would contribute to flight safety by facilitating CTM.26
3. METHODOLOGY: ERROR CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
3.1 Introduction
The research methodology was structured in three parts. First, the CTMerror
taxonomy (Chou, 1991) itself was studied and necessary changes made to it, basedon a
detailed analysis of the available ASRS incident reports. In particular,a structured
approach to error classification, such that specific errors made in taskmanagement were
clearly identified by their salient characteristics, was attempted. This would enableany
researcher to repeat the method and arrive at the same error classification. In other words,
an attempt was made to standardize the method of classification of these errors so that they
could be applied consistently to every incident or accident report. For eacherror category
classification, actual incident reports (containing theseerror categories) were reproduced,
verbatim, to illustrate better the specific task errors committed.
Second, 470 Aviation Safety and Reporting System (ASRS)2 incidentswere
identified and categorized using the revised error taxonomy. The focuswas on the descent
and landing phase of the flight regime. Appendix I providesa summary of these incident
reports from the ASRS database and summarizes the error categories identified in the
revised error taxonomy. ASRS classified these reports under several headings,
comprising, "In Flight Engine Emergencies" (99 reports), "Controlled Flight Toward
Terrain (CI, 1 1 )" (206 reports), "Cockpit Co-ordination Incidents" (100 reports), "Cockpit
Resource Management" (43 reports) and "Flight Crew Distraction Incidents" (100 reports).
These reports spanned several years from 1987 to 1993. They are byno means an
exhaustive list, since ASRS had other incident categories and they receive these kinds of
reports on a continual basis. The overriding evidence in all these reports, however, points
to a repetitive pattern of errors, further substantiating the belief that new kinds of errorsare
2 ASRS is a voluntary,anonymous reporting system (for pilots to call in and report incidents) developed and
operated (since 1976) by NASA for the FAA. A glossary of aviation terms used in this study is
givenin Appendix II.27
rare events. The original error taxonomy, therefore, was modified to reflect a more
accurate representation of the kinds of Cockpit Task Management errors committed.
Finally, while not forming the thrust of this thesis, an attemptwas made to identify
and assign the associated human cognitive failure (secondary) thatmay have caused the
error to take place. CTM errors may be traced to associated failings in the human cognitive
process. In particular, attention (processing limitations), workload (time-sharing),
judgment and decision-making in a multiple-task environmentare major cognitive
categories for each of these CTM errors. These secondary cognitive failures could be
further traced to more fundamental failures that have their origins in humanmemory
limitations, in particular, short-term memory limitations. It is hoped that another researcher
will be able to pick the thread up from here and explore this connection insome detail.
While flying an aircraft is a complex activity that embodies concepts entrenched in
both theoretical and applied research, the approach used here was froma human factors
perspective with emphasis on applied research findings.
3.2A Revised Error Taxonomy
The original CTM error taxonomy (Chou & Funk, 1990) drewupon some elements
of an earlier work by Rouse & Rouse (1983) and showedseven CTM functions at the
general level and, for each function, an error at the specific level (Table 2.6). Categorizing
cockpit task errors in this manner offered the opportunity to design specific
countermeasures for the associated errors.
A critical analysis (using formal definitions of the categories and also applying them
to a greater collection of incident reports) of the Chou & Funk error taxonomy revealed that
several of the error categories could either be eliminated completely (due to redundancy)or
streamlined for greater clarity. Central to the theme of going beyond 'pilot error'as a
causal factor for error committal was the utilization of the 'Five Whys Deep' concept28
(Crouch, 1992). This concept, entrenched in Total Quality Management (TQM) principles,
asks the question "why?", five times (with each why followingan answer to the previous
why) as a means of getting down to the root cause of the problem. The reasoningbehind
this being that, the root cause of a problem is often buried under several layers ofsub-
problems. The following is a hypothetical example of this technique.
1. Question: Why did the plane crash?
Answer: Due to 'pilot error'.
2. Question: Why did the pilot make the error?
Answer: He was trying to correct a maneuver on his approach but over-corrected.
3. Question: Why was he correcting the maneuver?
Answer: He was late configuring.
4. Question: Why was he late configuring?
Answer: He was caught high at the Outer Marker
5. Question: Why was he high at the Outer Marker?
Answer: He was distracted by a cabin crew member and forgot to tune in his final
Navaid frequency and hence lost his bearings.
Applying this simple technique, led to the elimination of superfluous categories and
resulted in a simpler error taxonomy. Often, the sub categorieswere defined after going
only two or three "whys deep". Hence, the Task Monitoring Lack categorywas eliminated
altogether since it was an answer at a superficial level (e.g. Question: Why did the plane
crash? Answer: Due to an inattentive crewthis does not reveal why the crew was
inattentive). The other error categories, on the other hand, appeared ata much deeper level
- after going several whys deep. Indeed, Task Monitoring Lack was a consequence of
some other task management errorusually found in a Task Prioritization Incorrect error
leading to the allocation of little or no resources to the monitoring ofa specific task. Crew
concentration, on a normal flight, was usually higher during the approach and take-off
phases of flight. It was easier to infer a condition of an inattentive crew than itwas to infer29
a task monitoring excessive condition (over-attentive crew?). Thereason for the inattention
was further traced to a mental resource allocation error which in turnwas almost always the
result of a task prioritization error. As aconsequence, the Task Monitoring Excessive
category was also deleted. Task Interruption no longer appearedas an error category
simply because it was one of the transition stages ofa task. Any task that was on-going or
pending could be interrupted; the interruption could bean emergency, such as an
explosion, a bird strike, a fire or even an overshoot dueto patchy fog, say. If the active,
in-progress task was the final approach anda fire broke out (task interrupted), the task
could be terminated and emergency procedures made to become theactive in-progress tasks
while a go-around was initiated. However, thecrew could have continued with the
approach if they believed that they could land the aircrafttask interrupted and emergency
procedures made active in-progress but initial task (landingnot terminated) still active.
Similarly, Task Resumption (which was consequentialto Task Interruption) was omitted,
as this would reveal itself in either Task Initiation or Task Termination categories. Note
that the components of Task Initiation had their complement in the TaskTermination
categories. For example, for an aircraft nearing its destination,a late configuration of the
aircraft to land (Task Initiation Late) had its complement in the failureto terminate cruise
phase (Task Termination Late). The previous Resource Allocationerror category was
eliminated completely because the preceding category, Task PrioritizationIncorrect would
have already determined where the resources would be allocated in accordanceto task
prioritization. In other words, Resource Allocation high/lowwas a redundant category.
This was replaced by the Task Prioritization Incorrecterror category. The Task
Termination Incorrect category was also eliminated since it proved almostimpossible to
find an instance of a crew member incorrectly terminatinga task in the 470 incidents
analyzed.
In addition, every task management error hadan initiating event (also called a
trigger event) which could be hard to discern at times. The triggeringevent, in the30
hypothetical plane crash example,was the pilot allowing himself to be interrupted bya
cabin crew member (a low priority task)on approach, which led to his omission of the
non-directional beacon (NDB) tuning and hencehis disorientation and, quite possibly,a lot
of over-corrections leading to the "crash". Sometimesthe triggering event wasa little more
subtle. Consider the example ofa flight at the Outer Marker, fully configured and
approaching the runway. Midway through the procedure,ATC decided to change the
runway designation and issued new landing clearance. The Captainaccepted the clearance
and tried to make it in, re-configuring for thenew runway and did a hard landing. The
triggering event for the hard landingwas not that the crew was late (or omittedsome steps)
at performing the several tasks preceding the landing. The captain'sacceptance of a
difficult clearance (in the short time frame) requiringan unreasonable amount of effort from
the flight crew, was the triggering event. This happenedin several of the incidentreports
where 'last-minute ATC changes' and other ATCmaneuvers (chiefly, the notorious 'slam-
dunk' approachbringing the aircraft in high and issuing landingclearances that required
the shedding of a considerable heights ina short time-frame) were deemed unnecessary and
mostly ascribed to controllers' convenience. Insome instances, the captains admitted that
they should not have accepted the clearances and that theyshould have initiated a go-around
if the revised clearances were for genuinereasons. These errors were not tabulated in the
error taxonomy since they were deemed to be judgmentalerrors.
Also, in classifying the errors committed, ifa specific error was committed twice
(or three times in some cases) in thesame incident, it was still counted as a single
occurrence. For example, if the pilot flying forgot to tune in thecorrect NDB frequency
(task initiation lack) and later forgot to ask for landingclearance (task initiation lack, again)
it was still counted as oneoccurrence in the same incident report. However, ifan error was
committed in a specific category (descendingtoo early, say - task initiation early error)
which occurred as a result of the pilot being pre-occupiedin a conversation with a flight
attendant, say (task prioritization incorrect error), then theerrors were logged in both31
categories. This was inevitable since the method of classifying theerrors relied on exact
erroneous actions of the crew, not implied ones. In the example of the pilot talkingto a
flight attendant, both the errors were specifically observable. However,some of the errors
involving task prioritization were more subtle.
There were also several cases (77 incidents) oferrors due crew members mis-
dialing the altitude alerter, tuning in the wrong radio frequencies, landingat the wrong
airfields, refusing to abort dangerous approaches and the like.While these were filtered
out of this research, since they did not fall under the CTM error categoriesas defined
currently, they deserve at least a passing mention due to their significance.These errors
could be categorized under three distinct groups:
Mistakes where the intention itself, in the task execution,was incorrect. This
may have been due to a lack of knowledge of systems, aircraft position or attitude,
etc. An example of a mistake would be the entering of the wrong coordinates (ofa
way point) into the flight director. Yet another example would be to turn on (or off)
the wrong switch on the control panel. In all these examples, the pilotwas
conscious of his/her actions, believing them to be correct actions and therefore
executed correctly with respect to his/her intentions. Similarly, misreadingaltimeter
settings of 29.01 as 29.10 were classified as mistakesas were mis-interpretations
of altitude clearances.
Slips - where the intention was correct but the resulting action, withrespect to the
intention, was incorrect. Reason (1987) referred to slipsas the failure of actions to
go as intended (execution failures). Slips may be viewed as an automatic mode of
behavior in which conscious attention is diverted elsewhere (O'Hare & Roscoe,
1990). An example of a slip would be the mis-entering of the coordinates ofa way
point into the flight director which could be due to the slip ofa finger. Shutting
down a good engine when the intention was to shut the problematicone is also a
slip. There was an another instance of a slip in the report analyses, wherea pilot
copied down the correct minimum altitude to be set in the altitude alerter and
subsequently dialed another altitude, with his note pad directly in front for
reference.32
Violations- where the intention was to deviate, knowingly, from procedures.
The decisions by the captain (or co-pilot)to deviate from procedures despite the
better judgment (based on SOP'sor ATC instructions) of the other crew members
were also termed violations. There were several violations recorded in thereport
analyses. Most of them related to instances where the captainsrefused to listen to
fellow crew members' inputs about landing below minimumweather conditions.
In all of these cases, the captains landed the aircraft despitealerts by other crew
members to abort the landing.
Judgmental Errors- where the decisions made were not optimal. These errors
were admitted to by the pilots in the report narratives. Pilots decidedto accept a
change in ATC clearance while on finals (fully configured)and then discovered that
they could not make it admitted to having madepoor decisions.
There may be a case for including thiscategory of errors as a sub-set under the
CTM umbrella since they all relate to specific tasks and theirremedies parallel those for the
CTM errors. A total of 470 ASRS incidentswere thus analyzed in detail and a revised
error taxonomy that reflected a more accurate assessment of taskerrors committed in the
cockpit environment was constructed (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Revised Error Taxonomy (Madhavan & Funk,1993)
General Level Specific Level
Task Initiation
Early
Late
Lack
Task Prioritization Incorrect
Task Termination Early
Late
Lack33
3.3CTM Error Category Definitions
The net result of the streamlining wasa simple error classification scheme for
Cockpit Task Management errors. Beforeany further discussion is possible it would be
pertinent to give some formal definitions of the variouserror categories and their salient
characteristics.
Error Category: Task Initiation Early
Definition
Beginning a task before its initiating event window (beforeits assigned schedule in
the flight plan).
Notes
The problem here was to determine whena particular task should have been started
by the flight crew. For the majority of the descent andlanding incidents reviewed
here, Air Traffic Control (ATC) determined the 'schedule'.For example, ATC
issued approach and descent clearances which, when receivedby the cockpit crew,
resulted in a planned approach with specific actionsto be carried out at each stage of
the approach when to tune specific navaids, whento change communication
frequencies, when to configure, lower flaps etc. Therewere exceptions to the
degree of control the flight crew had over the assignment of the'schedule' which
depended on the type of approach that the aircraft would beexecuting. For CAT HI
(auto land) approaches and certain CAT H (vectored) approaches,ATC decided on
courses and altitudes to be flown, and turns to be taken at each stage until
touchdown. The management of the actual tasks, however, including themethods
utilized to execute any maneuver (configuring, decision pointassignment, flaring
etc.) or deploy any control surfaceon the aircraft, was determined by the flight
crew which in turn relied on the airline's standard operating procedure (SOP) for
each specific task.34
Some examples of Task Initiation Earlyerrors were:
- the beginning of the descent phase prematurely.
- carrying out corrective actions before confirming the problem (especially in
emergencies).
-calling waypoints and altitudes (unconsciously) to ATC before arrivalat that point.
Conscious, false callouts (there were some of these made by thecrew attempting to
`make it in' regardless of weather or traffic conditions)were classified as
violations.
How were these inferred from the incident reports?
To a large extent, the report narratives themselves identified these TaskInitiation
Early errors. Four examples of actual ASRS report narratives thatinvolved this
type of error are given below. They were reproduced verbatimexcept for some
comments included for clarification purposes in parentheses.
ASRS Report # 209614
"...I started a R turn. At aprox. 1500 ft. MSL [meansea level] the
R fire light and bell sounded. As I looked at the glowing fire
handle, the Cpt. reached up, without saying anything tome, and
pulled the R fire handle, shutting down the R. engine ].Task
Initiation Early].....and could not believe that the engine #2was
winding down. The R hand fire light went outas Cpt. said, "Ah! I
screwed up"!
Here, the Cpt. responded almost instinctively to the alarm without confirming
visuallyas per SOP, whether it was a real fire or, as it turned out to be in thiscase, a false
alarm.35
ASRS Report # 209868
"..cleared to 3000 ft. on a downwind. Forsome unexplained
reason, 1000 ft. was set in the alt. alert window. I sensedwe were
descending and turned my attention back to the cockpitand saw we
were descending [Task Initiation Early]. I told F/O tostop
descent at 2500 ft"
Here, the aircraft was cleared to 3000 ft. by ATC and then(implied) to await further
instructions. The F/O, perhaps focusingmore on the alt. alerter to advise him to stop
descending rather than listening to ATC instructions,descended out of 3000 ft.
prematurely. if we took this errorone more level down i.e. ask the question 'why?' again,
we may find that the error was probably due to the mistake of mis-dialingthe altitude alerter
(root cause).
Note that the latter diagnosis, mis-dialing the altitude alerter,was largely an inferred
one and was offered as a 'contributory cause'. It may turn out to have been the'root
cause'. However, since it was not clear what the F/Owas thinking at the time of the error
commission, his error was ruled on the basis of whatwas known for certain - that he
descended too early.
ASRS Report # 194905
"Upon arriving at ARA the wx was marginal VFR and the Capt
recd a verbal apch brief from the ctslr...our initial alt. was 1600'
to the FAF [Final Approach Fix] and the MDA [Minimum Descent
Altitude] was 420'. The FAF was 4.4 mi from thearpt. Aprox 4
mi before the FAF Capt instructedme to dsnd to MDA.....noting
some agitation in his voice and having visual contact with the
ground I began to dsnd" [Task Initiation Early]36
The co-pilot complied with the captain'serroneous decision to descend early. The
co-pilot did voice his concern but decidedto follow orders because he had full visual
contact with the ground and, presumably, could have taken correctiveaction if necessary.
It appeared that the F/O may not have complied if they hadno visual contact with the
ground. However, these are speculations. If the decisionto descend early was a
conscious decision this would be termed a violation.
ASRS Report # 211425
",.vectored for final ....told to maintain 5000 ft andrpt field in
sight. ATC super called and said..he showedus at 4000 ft. We
previously had leveled off at 5000 ft...I looked at the altimeters
and they displayed approx. 4000 ft....the Capt hadspun the alt
selector to 0000 and begun a gradual dscnt without tellingme
[Task Initiation Early]....Just thenwe got a TCAS II RA of
"clb, clb now".
The Captain assumed that the co-pilot had called airport in sightand begun a slow
descent without informing his co-pilot. Thiswas a busy airport and the co-pilot was busy
with a traffic watch. Several other errorswere committed as a consequence of this initial
error.
Error Category: Task Initiation Late
Definition
Beginning a task after its initiating event window (after its assignedschedule in the
flight plan)
Notes
Again, ATC and SOP's are the benchmark from whichwe infer deviations. Some
examples of lask initiation late errors were:
- late in configuring the aircraft (for final approach and landing)37
- late altitude callouts or warnings by cockpit crew members
- late reactions to ATC instructions
The following were some examples of incident reports that had this element.
ASRS Report # 192660
"We were vectored to start the apch. over the Marker. At the Marker, as
we turned to intercept the GS [Glide Slope] and start the descent, the F/O
was slow to correct back to the course [Task Initiation Late], but I'm
afraid we had a momentary full scale deflection to the left (on the GS)".
This report is more explicit (as opposed to the inferred ones above) and blames the
First Officer, who was lagging behind the aircraft, for the error.
ASRS Report # 200203
"On an autoland (CAT III) aprch into O'Hare, I began final dscnt cklist.
The Capt. realized we weren't down quick enough with the autopilot and
dis-engaged it as we finished our final configuration.I became
concerned with our being high and fast on the GS. Factors that led to the
incident...staying with the planned coupled aprch too long [Task
Initiation Late] causing us to be higher and faster than planned".
The First Officer admitted that they hung onto the planned coupled approach
(usually a mandatory requirement for CAT III landings by most airlines) longer than
necessary, which resulted in a late full-configuration.
ASRS Report # 202129
"The TCAS II's RA [Resolution Alert] temporarily diverted our attn of
our [sic] alignment for the turn to final for rwy 24R. Turn was started38
just prior to rwy. ctrline [Task Initiation Late].Bank angle was
increased to 45 ° to minimize overshoot".
Here, the error was alluded to in the narrative. Withboth pilots' attention drawn by
the traffic alert, they were late turningon to finals which left them with a steep angle of
bank to correct very rapidly.
ASRS Report # 202390
"..first approach resulted ina GAR [go around] at 500 ft. above ground
when we had not caught GS (Glide Slope)....Inexperienced Capt. slow
and late executing procs and preparing (configuring)aircraft" [Task
Initiation Late].
The error here was also identified when the Captainwas caught lagging behind the
aircraft. In addition, the root cause (Captain's inexperience)was also stated very clearly in
the conclusion of the report by the First Officer.
Error Category: Task Initiation Lack
Definition
The omission of a particular taskor the omission of a task in a sequence of tasks.
Notes
ATC instructions and SOP's were again usedas benchmarks from which deviations
were inferred. Phrases in the narratives such as, "..should havedone..", "..hadn't
selected..", "..did not.. ", "..omitted..", etc., all pointedto some specific task
omission. In some cases theerror had to be inferred [e.g. when the pilot not flying
(PNF) did not check the pilot flying's (PF) instrumentsto verify that they were set
correctly on approach.].39
The following were some examples of incident reports exhibitingthese kinds of
error.
ASRS Report # 197423
"..we were concentrating on the apch and missed the callto TWR [Task
Initiation Lack]".
Here, the pilot readily admitted that thecrew was too engrossed on the approach
that they forgot to call TWR for the landing clearance which resulted inan unauthorized
landing. In actual fact, this was a Task Prioritization Incorrecterror, where all
available resources were focused on the approach withno residual for other tasks, which
led to the Task Initiation Lack error.
ASRS Report # 203313
"..Improper instr procsnot checking alt while passing marker [Task
Initiation Lack] and pre-occupation with maintaining visualcontact
with preceding aircraft...".
This was similar to the preceding report, where allresources were consumed by the
traffic watch Task Prioritization Incorrect, which resulted in the omission ofan
altitude check on approach.
ASRS Report # 201848
"....After starting our apch (following problem with the operation
of our slats), the F/O noticed that the hydraulicpumps were not in the HI
pos [necessary for normal slat operation Task Initiation Lack].
After selecting HI pump pos, the slats operated normally."40
The engineer forgot to set the required positionon the pump selector which resulted
in the emergency. The errorwas detected a little later by the F/O but not before an
emergency was declared and preparations made for anemergency landing
Error Category: Task Prioritization Incorrect
Definition
An error resulting from the allocation ofcrew resources to a task of less immediate
importance over one that requiredmore immediate attention.
Notes
This category of errors was, toa large extent, inferred from the narratives. By far,
it was the largest category in the taxonomy. Thiswas not surprising because a
significant number of errors that fell into the other categorieswere as a consequence
of the misprioritization of tasks before-hand.
The following narratives involvedsome aspects of task mis-prioritization.
ASRS Report # 20223
"...we were fully focused [Task Prioritization Incorrect]on the
CAT HI apch [auto-land]a first for both of us and forgot [Task
Initiation Lack] to give the fit attendants the three bellsignal for
imminent lndg....and two, of the four attendants,were standing [in the
aisle] at touchdown."
Total attention was given to this novel approach (i.e. all availableresources were
allocated on this new approach) that the pilots forgot theirroutine task of giving the timely
landing warning.
In another similar incident, the crewwas engrossed in a traffic watch and also
omitted the landing warning with the result that they landed witha few food trolleys in the
aisle.41
ASRS Report # 201415
"..Capt. was distracted for a few mins by the flt. attend. whocame up to
the cockpit to ask a question [Task Prioritization Incorrect]....and
he missed the alt. x'ing restriction."[Task Termination Lack]
The captain committed the error of placing greater importance to acknowledgingthe
flight attendant rather than ATC approach instructions. He was also in violation of the
`sterile cockpit' rules - rules that forbid cabin crew members from going into the cockpitat
certain times of the flight, such as during take-offs, landings and emergencies.
ASRS Report # 197777
"..looking for tfc [traffic] outside after TCAS II showed close tfc. Went
thro' 9000 ft by 270 ft. and immdtly [sic] climbed backup.always
stabilize the aircraft before both heads are outside" [Task
Prioritization Incorrect].
During the descent, the crew was so engrossed in the traffic watch, followinga
TCAS II alert, that they forgot to level off after arriving at the cleared altitude. Thiserror
also gave rise to yet another (consequential) error Task Termination Late (i.e. the
crew forgot, momentarily, to terminate the descent after reaching the intermediate goal of
9000 ft.)
ASRS Report # 210234
".. we had both failed to note the turn to the N at TWIK
intxn....All preoccupied by a cockpit distractionCapt. pushed the Flt.
Attnd. call button to p/u [pick up] meal tray. No one responded andtray
fell onto floor. Capt. picked up the mess and took it back to the galley
[Task Prioritization Incorrect] and...I got real busy with several
radio calls and alt. chges..."42
Here, the captain attended to a lower priority task (clearing the meal tray)and left
the cockpit to the F/O at a very busy time.
Error Category: Task Termination Early
Definition
The disengagement of a particular task, too early (before its goal ismet) in the
sequence of tasks.
Examples included:
- the early termination of a radio tracking procedure.
- the early termination of an altitude hold feature.
the early termination of the auto-pilot.
Notes
SOP's and, to a certain extent, ATC instructions servedas benchmarks from which
deviations were inferred. In some cases the pilots admittedto the specific error
committed.
Note that when a pilot overshot a descent altitude and the actionwas corrected (by
the aircrew or ATC), it was not termed a Task Termination Lackerror; rather,
it was termed a Task Termination Late error. When ATC instructedan aircraft
to descend and hold at 4000 ft. say, and the pilot descended to 3000 ft before itwas
noticed (and corrected) by ATC radar or a fellow crew member, theerror was
termed a Task Termination Late error. If the aircrew (or ATC) didnot catch
the error and no correction was made, then it would be termeda Task
Termination Lack error.
Some examples of report narratives involving Task Termination Earlyerrors
were:43
ASRS Report # 210716
"...while awaiting GS [Glide Slope] capture,we were sent to tower.
Tower advised us that RVR [Runway Visual Range]was below our
minsIn the meantime [at 10 DME] the FO had released alt hold
[Task Termination Early] and descended below GS intercept alt and
has [sic] fallen below GS too! We were already 400' low when I looked
up".
Here, the First Officer (FO) terminated the altitude hold feature toosoon and
descended below the GS capture altitude by 400 feet.
ASRS Report # 216617
"...we were approaching LAX ..at 7000 ft. Apch ctlr ..clearedus out of
7000 ft for 6000 ft. our TCAS II [Trafficfferrain Collision Avoidance
System] began giving us a TA [Traffic Alert] for the acft apchingrwys
25. Distracted by the aural TCAS II warning, I failed to note that the
autoplt's level-off alt of 6000 ft had become disarmed". [Task
Termination Early]".
The captain noticed the early disengagement of the altitude level-off feature only
after the aircraft had descended to 5700 ft.-a loss of 300 ft. The captain, in his extended
report, attributes this error (a slip perhaps?) to the relative inexperience of his co-pilot.
ASRS Report # 196736
"...The PNF (Capt) was in the process of completing the apch chklist
when clrnc for the bay apch was given. The chklist was interrupted
[Task Termination Early] leaving an incorrect inboundcourse set in
the ILS front course window. On this acft this will result inan improper
capture of the loc [localizer] which occurred in this case."44
While the termination of the final approach checklistwas categorized as a Task
Termination Early error (actual error), it was alsoa Task Prioritization Incorrect
error (implied error) that led the crew to place greater emphasis on the clearance than the
checklist items - one of which was the ILS frequency check.
ASRS Report # 98235
"...weather was IMC..radar showed the strongest returns ahead and to
the left with turbs increasing to mod. We were now in the middle of the
red area and the turbs were quite strong. It took the autopilota few secs
to start the turn due to the turb. The capt. didn't like the way the
autopilot was starting the turn and quickly turned it off [Task
Termination Early]. At the same time the strongest of the turbs hit
and the capt started over controlling".
Here, the early termination of the autopilot in thunderstorms caused thecrew to lose
control of the aircraft for several minutes. The auto pilot was engaged againas soon as the
plane was straight and level.
Error Category: Task Termination Late
Definition
The disengagement of a particular task, too late (after its goal had been met) in the
sequence of tasks.
Examples included:
the late termination of initial approach phase resulting in a 'high arrival'.
the late termination of circuit legs, e.g. downwind leg or base leg.
the late termination of procedures, e.g. checklist items, coupled approachesetc.45
Notes
Again, SOP's and ATC instructions served as benchmarks from which deviations
were inferred. In some cases the pilots admitted to late termination of specific tasks.
Phrases such as "..lagging behind the aircraft/ATC instructions", "..heldonto the coupled
approach for too long", "..overshot the base leg", "..stayed with the downwind leg fortoo
long" etc., all pointed to a Task Termination Lateerror. Some examples of report
narratives involving Task Termination Late errors were:
ASRS Report # 197423
"Both pilots set for the apch to 23L. We were cleared to 3000' for the
intercept and then cleared for the approach. We were in and out of the
bases of clouds. I then elected to start descent to 2500' ...noticed that
the ADF [Automatic Direction Finder] needle did not coincide with the
localizer course. I immediately stopped the descent at 2500' [Task
Termination Late]..and the loc needles had deflected full to the right.
Ctlr asked if we had the loc for rwy 28. It was at this moment I had
realized we had set up for the wrong apch. He then informedus that we
should be at 3000'...".
Here, both pilots set themselves up for the approach to thewrong runway. Despite
the captain's reservations about the heading clearances (forrunway 28), both pilots
followed them while all the while assuming that theywere heading for runway 23L. They
overshot the 3000' clearance by 500' before they realized theerror.
ASRS Report # 200203
"I began the final descent chklist. The capt realized we weren't getting
down quick enough I finished the final dscnt chklist inside the
Final Approach Fix [Task Termination Late] and became concerned
with our still being high and fast on the GS. We continued with the
approach and landed long. However, by devoting so much attn to what46
the pilot flying was doing, I neglected my duties Factors that led to
the incident:... staying with the coupled approach for too long [Task
Termination Late]".
This incident had several error categories in it. Late configuration (Task
Initiation Late), task sequencing (Task Prioritization Incorrect), omittingobtaining
landing clearance (Task Initiation Lack) and hangingon to the coupled approach (Task
Termination Late) all caused the aircraft to take almost the entire length of therunway to
come to a stop. The First Officer was still doing his checklist well inside the Final
Approach Fix.
ASRS Report # 132717
"The plt flying started a dscnt upon intercepting the localizer. the PNF
spoke up about 150' below our proper alt and then at 300' below yelled,
pull up you are too low. We need 1800'. The PF complied [Task
Termination Late] but was still unaware of what he had donewrong.
After establishing correct alt there was a short discussionon correct proc.
Contributing factors were, possibly: the wx was poor at Sacramento.
....and much discussion about whether to do a CAT Ior CAT II apch
and who would be flying [Task Prioritization Incorrect]. Iwas
tired and we had been flying for 5+ hrs and beenon duty for 9hr and 45
min. Our crew meals had not been boarded on the acft".
This tired and hungry crew appeared to lack a single command authority.Not
being able to decide on the type of approach and, more importantly, who should flythe
approach led to a sloppy approach (Task Prioritization Incorrect) and it appearedthat
decisions were made by a committee of peopleon board rather than the captain.
ASRS Report # 126484
"Dsnding from 5000' to 3500', the ctrlr asked us to reduce spdto 180
kts. ..the capt asked for flaps and did not get slat extension...Ctrlr47
notified of problem and that the apch spd would be higher than normal.
... we wereinformed that we were high and told to "get it down" twice.
The pilot did not have the GS indication and thought that hewas high
above the GS. The pilot tried to intercept the GS from above and get it
down as requested by the ctrlr. We passed the OM below the published
alt and a GAR was initiated (Task Termination Late). A fewsecs
later the "whoop-whoop" signal sounded. Everything which occurred
after the slats failed to extend was more rushed and pressured than it
would have been...."
The crew decided to go around (GAR) just seconds before the terrain warning
sounded. The controller was not aware that a flapless/slatless landing would be ata higher
speed than a fully configured landing speed and demanded normal speed adherence. The
captain, however, could have insisted on maintaining 180 kts. all theway to the threshold
(which he did not) and some mention was made of the captain's "lack of authority".
However, the crew should have decided on the GAR immediately after their failure to
capture the GS and when they sensed that they were too high.
Error Category: Task Termination Lack
Definition
The failure to end a particular task (after its goal had been met or could not be met
safely) in the sequence of tasks.
Some instances of these kinds of errors included:
- going ahead with the landing when the weather had deteriorated to 'below
minimums'.
going below cleared altitude (by ATC) and on to landing without clearance.
Notes
SOP's and ATC instructions served as benchmarks from which deviationswere
inferred. In some cases the pilots admitted to the omission of specific tasks. Key48
phrases (in the narratives) in this category included "..failedto perform ..",
"..forgot to call ..", "..omitted ..", "..overlooked .." etc. Note that theerror was
committed unintentionally. If the intention was to omit the task then it would be
termed a violation.
Some examples of report narratives involving Task Termination Lackerrors
were:
ASRS Report # 133889
"The MAP (Missed Approach Point) is 10000' MSL and 2mi. I could
still see the apch lights and contd with apch. At 1/2mi the fogwas
shifting and momentarily obscured our view of the airport. Wewere
well inside the MAP so I said to continue [Task Termination Lack].
I feel the situation developed too fast to see it early. The apch looked
better in terms of wx(weather) at 4mi than it did at 2mi".
The pilot continued with the descent and landed despite the deteriorating weather
conditions. There were several reports that exhibited a similar pattern of behavior by the
crew. The tendency for crews to be optimistic (always hoping and, indeed, believing them
to be good) in marginal weather conditions was not uncommon in the incidents analyzed.
ASRS Report # 216617
".. cleared us out of 7000' for 6000'. When I turned back I noticed the
acft at 5800' and dsnding [Task Termination Lack]. I called out the
descent to the F/O who was flying. The acft contd to dscnd....".
The captain was occupied with a traffic watch (another aircraft crossing his
aircraft's path) and did not notice that his aircraft had overshot his descent altitude clearance
of 5000 ft.49
ASRS Report # 132100
"...what happened next was an unstable dsnt (steeper than normal) to get
back on profile. When we got closer to the grnd the GPWS activated
due to the steep dsnt. [Task Termination Lack]. The acft got on the
PAPI system at 1/2 mi. final and the lndg was within touchdown zone
and uneventful. Looking at hindsight, our course of action should have
been missed apch with vectors back to try again"!
The pilots made a non-procedural turn to base leg (extended base leg) to shed more
height and continued with a steep descent despite the GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning
System) siren going off. The correct procedure, as the pilot admitted, would have been to
terminate the landing and go around for a second attempt at landing.
ASRS Report # 222508
"Capt took airplane from me and said he was going to fly apch. WX was
reported to be RVR at 2400. Ctrlr asked "RVR is 1600' do you need
2400"? Capt ignored call..... at100' capt executed missed apch [Task
Termination Late] straight ahead to 4000'. Visibility dropped to below
2400' RVR [on second approach] and apch terminated with a firm lndg"
[Task Termination Lack].
The captain may have violated minimum runway visual range (RVR) rules by
landing the aircraft when the RVR dropped below 2400 ft. Whether it was done
intentionally (a violation) was not clear in the narrative. The captain claimed that he could
see 2400 feet ahead but the co-pilot (reporter) disagreed.50
4. METHODOLOGY: A$RS REPORT ANALYSES
4.1Analyses
Of the 540 ASRS incident reports received, 470 were deemed to be unique
incidents. Thirty one incidents were recorded twice by ASRS and designated with unique
report numbers, possibly as an oversight on its part. The remainder did not fall underany
of the categories as currently defined. The revised error taxonomywas applied to the 470
ASRS incidents reviewed using the format described in the preceding chapter. Eachof the
incident narratives was read and its associated CTM errors identified, categorized and the
totals tallied at the end. There were several incidents (4.5% of total reviewed) relatedto
small aircraft (light single-engine planes to small twin-engine commuter aircraft) that
displayed C1M errors. These were eliminated from the classificationas the focus was on
airline incidents. While the focus was on the descent and landing phases of the flight
regime, there were a few reports (less than 5%) that dealt with the cruise phaseas well as
the take-off phase of flight. There were 231 CTM error related incidents out of the 470
reports analyzed (49.2%). Air Traffic Control (ATC) errors caused 33 of the incidents that
were reported (these errors were caught by pilots). The special category of mistakes,
violations, slips and judgmental errors accounted for 11 incident reports. Therewere 77
occurrences of this special category of errors that appeared (in one form or another) that did
not result in CTM errors. Maintenance and faulty equipment related reports accounted for 9
incident reports but did not lead to any CTM errors being committed. Weather-induced
incidents that resulted in correct recovery procedures by the flightcrew accounted for eight
of the reported incidents. Emergency related incidents (fire, explosion,passenger illness,
landing gear problems, flame-outs etc.) that resulted in correctrecovery procedures
accounted for 33 reports. A breakdown of initial search of the 470 reportswas tabulated as
shown in Table 4.1 and depicted pictorially in Figure 4.1.Table 4.1Analysis of 470 ASRS incident reports reviewed
Problem Origin Number of Incidents Relative %
Classified CTM error categories 231 49.2
Other (CRM incidents) 124 26.4
Air Traffic control (ATC) 33 7.0
Emergencies 33 7.0
Small Aircraft 21 4.5
Violations, Mistakes, Slips, Judgment errors 11 2.3
Maintenance & Equipment 9 1.9
Weather _L _L2
Total 470 100
Maint. & Eqpt.
1.9%
Slips, Judgment 4.5%
Violations, Mistakes,
Small aircraft 4.5%
Emergencies
7%
Air Traffic
Control
7%
Weather 1.7%
CTM Errors
49.2%
CRM Errors
26.4%
Figure 4.1Analysis of 470 ASRS Incident Reports
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In addition, there were in the report narratives, several references to high workload
situations. Phrases such as "..1 got real busy..", -..congested traffic ..", ".. complex
approach pattern.", "overwhelmed by the multiple tasks.." etc. were all actual phrases used
by pilots to indicate an overloading of their resources to effectively execute the required
tasks. There were limits to the number of tasks pilots could handle concurrently and
perform them all effectively. In studies of human ability to carry out two tasks
simultaneously, accurate performance of one could only be maintained (under high
workload situations), at the expense of poor performance in the other. Studieson multiple
task performance and time sharing abilities under high workload situations have been
conducted by several researchers notably by Wickens (1984, 1988), Parasuraman (1984),
Ruffel Smith (1979) and Jennings (1977). Studies have shown that it is possibleto
perform certain non-conflicting tasks concurrently without performance decrement in either
(Wickens, 1984, Parasuraman, 1984). Furthermore, the ability of pilots to perform
multiple tasks had been shown to be related to the processing demands imposed by the
individual tasks (Wickens et. al., 1984).
Workload was a difficult concept to define precisely although each of us would
know and recognize it when it got uncomfortably high. This suggests that it is largely
cognitive in character (O'Hare & Roscoe, 1990). In addition, pilots make an attempt to
maintain performance through increased effort (since they know which flight phasesare
more demanding), in which case subjective measures of workload rating may be the most
sensitive (Rehman et. al, 1983).
High mental workload appeared to be significant from the Descent-to-the-Outer-
Marker phase onwards. Tracking the ILS, maintaining traffic watch, communication with
ATC, operation of control surfaces (flaps, spoilers etc.) and tracking the runway center line
were the specific tasks identified (by some pilots interviewed) as imposing more mental
workload. The succeeding activities following the touch-down did not pose as much of a
mental workload as during the immediate preceding phase.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1Results
53
There were three levels of segmentation of the CTM errorsat the general level, at
the specific level and a detailed segmentation at the specific level. Asummary of the CTM
errors classified at the general level is given in Figure 5.1 below.
Task Termination
23.5%
Task Prioritization
35%
Task Initiation
41.5%
Figure 5.1 Percentage of CTM errors by General Error Categories
A detailed look at these 231 classified CTM error incidents to show the relative distribution
of the specific errors is depicted in Table 5.1. Figure 5.2 is a pictorial display of thesame
results.54
Table 5.1Percentage of CTM errors by General Error Category in 231 ASRS incidents
General Error
Category
Number
of Errors
Relative
Percentage
Specific
Error
Number
of Errors
Relative
Percentage
Early 35 10
Task Initiation 145 41.5 Late 24 6.9
Lack 86 24.6
Task
Prioritization
122 35 Incorrect122 35
Early 6 1.7
Task Termination 82 23.5 Late 44 12.6
Lack 32 9.2
Total 349 100 349 100
Task Termination Lack
9.2%
Task Termination Late
12.6%
Task Termination
Early 1.7%
Task Initiation Early
10%
Task Initiation Late
Task Initiation
Lack 24.6%
Task Prioritization
Incorrect 35%
Figure 5.2Percentage of CTM Errors by Specific Error Categories55
A third level of segmentation of the specificerror categories led to the classification
of the actual types of errors committed.These errors were summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2Percentage of CTM errors by Specific ErrorCategory in 231 ASRS
incidents
General Error
Category
Specific
Error
Number
of Errors
Specific
Error
No. of
Errors
Rel.
%
Early Descent 28 8.0
Early 35 Early Chklist 2 0.6
Other 5 1.4
Task Initiation
Late 24
Late Configuration
Late Cal louts
20
2
5.7
0.6
Other 2 0.6
Navaid tuning lack66 19.0
Lack 86 Non checking of PF4 1.1
Other 16 4.6
Traffic watch 54 15.5
Task PrioritizationIncorrect 122 Weather watch 23 6.6
Other 45 12.9
Early 6 Auto pilot off early 4 1.1
Other 2 0.6
Task TerminationLate 44 Altitude overshoot
Other
39
5
11.1
1.4
Didn't abort landing23 6.6
Lack 32 Descent alt. o/shoot6 1.72
Other 30.86
Total 349 349 100
The caveat concerning the use of the ASRSdatabase for strict statistical analyses
was discussed in chapter 2 (Section 2.1). To recapitulate,the main drawback with ASRS
incident analyses is that these reportsare not random; often, safety-minded peoplereport
more often or some recent incidence of accidentsor legislation may prompt more reportsto
be submitted. In addition, I lookedat incident reports that I expected would showa higher57
5.2Discussion of Error Categories
General Task Initiation Errors
The general error category of task initiation accounted for 41.5% of the three
possible general error categories- 145 out of 349 errors. The Task Initiation Early
category accounted for 24% of task initiation errors while the Task Initiation Late
category and Task Initiation Lack categories accounted for 17% and 59% respectively.
It would appear therefore, that the task initiation error category was the main CTMerror
category. However, the true picture was not so readily evident as the following discussion
of the specific error categories in this and the other major segments indicated.
Specific Task Initiation Errors
Task Initiation Early
Almost all the errors in this category dealt with pilots descending out of specific
altitude clearances. Pilots did not wait for specific waypoints to cross before descendingor
they just decided (for some unknown reason) to leave the specified altitudea little early. It
was also noted that a few of these errors (9 out of 35 incidents 26% of Task Initiation
Early errors) occurred as a result of mitigating circumstances (suchas emergencies, poor
weather or very high workload). In these instances, tasks were wrongly prioritized and
resources diverted to other tasks thus causing the crew to commit these Task Initiation
Early errors. The second largest sub-category of errors (14% of Task Initiation Early
errors) here was referred to as 'Other' and involved instances of early task initiation suchas
a hasty decision to shut down an engine (before confirming an initial diagnosis), early
deployment of flaps and/or early deployment of an acute flap angle. Early checklist items
(5.7% of Task Initiation Early errors) referred to instances where crew members
started doing a particular check list item before arrival at that stage (e.g. doinga final
landing check while on long finals).58
Task Initiation Late
The overwhelming majority of errors in this category involved late configuration of
the aircraft (83% of Task Initiation Late errors) by the crew. Most of these (14 of the
20 incidents 70%) were caused by "high workload" situations where thecrew members
were trying to accomplish several goals in a very short time frame. All of them, however,
were crew-induced errors caused by late termination of the initial descent phase resulting in
a confused set of activities involving ATC communications, losing considerable height,
maintaining traffic watch and communicating with cabin staff and passengers. In other
words, due to the late termination of the initial descent phase, subsequent taskswere mis-
prioritized (with the consequential mis-allocation of resources) resulting in late initiation of
other tasks. Late callouts and "Other" (2 of the 24 incidents8.3% each) were the other
remaining errors in this category. The "Other"' errors referred to suchcases of late
adherence to ATC instructions or late deployment of control surfaces.
Task Initiation Lack
This CTM error category accounted for 24.65% of all specific errors committed.
The omission of tuning of navigational and communication aids (77% of Task Initiation
Lack errors) was the specific error committed. Crew members omitted tuning the tower
frequency (after having been on approach frequency) and invariably omitted getting landing
clearance with the subsequent unauthorized landing in every instance. Each crew member
assumed that the other had obtained landing clearance without realizing that they could not
have obtained one without being on tower frequency. In some cases debates arose as to
whether a landing clearance had been issued and the crew talked themselves into the belief
that permission had been granted. No attempt was ever made (in all of these incidents) to
confirm with tower on the landing clearance issue. Having filed the reports most pilots59
adduced the error to 'late and delayed hand-offs' by ATC. Having beenon approach
frequency for a fair length of time the aircraft was usually cleared to contacttower at an
assigned frequency at a later point in time. The hand-off was not immediate (i.e. thecrew
could not switch from approach to tower frequency immediately) and thecrew had to
remember, when they were at a particular point on finals, to switch to tower and obtain (or
confirm) the landing clearance. Given the high workload situation just priorto landing, in
all instances, this task was forgotten.
The other scenario described by the pilots was referred to as ATC's "slam-dunk" approach
to bring aircraft in high and then issue clearances to shed considerable height in a short
time frame. Having accepted these difficult clearances, several taskswere omitted as the
crew sought to configure (first priority) the aircraft. These clearances were described (by
pilots) as "ploys" to make the controller's job of separating traffic easier. While therewere
instances of the acceptance of 'difficult' clearances (8 out of 86 incidents 9%), itmust be
noted that the final decision to accept the clearance still rested with the captain. In four of
these incidents the pilots did state that they would have initiateda go-around if they had to
do it again. The "Other" specific error (18% of Task Initiation Lack errors) included
such instances as the non-deployment of landing gear (on landing), flapsor other control
equipment on board. The omission of checking duties i.e. pilot not flying (PNF) checking
pilot flying (PF) (5% of Task Initiation Lack errors) was the remaining specificerror in
this category. PNF's in most of these instances did not cross reference or confirm that the
PF's instruments (Navaids, Radios) were tuned to the correct frequencies resulting in
missed execution of tasks.
General Task Prioritization Errors
The general error category of task prioritization accounted for 35% of the
three possible error categories122 out of 349 errors. This put it second to the task60
initiation error category as far as the generalerror category was concerned. If the specific
error category were to be looked at, then task prioritization errors appeared to be the main
CTM error category. As the specific error discussion below will reveal, taskprioritization
errors were not easy to discern.
Specific Task Prioritization Errors
Task Prioritization Incorrect
This was the largest of CTM specific error categories (122 of 349 incidents35%)
but the numbers themselves do not tell the whole story. As indicated in theearlier error
categories, a large number of those specific errorswere consequential to task prioritization
errors. This was inferred from the narratives and duly recorded only in incidents where it
was very obvious. In most instances Task Prioritization Incorrect errorswere very
subtle. The following scenario describes the complexity. Ifa specific error was committed
(late aircraft configuration, say Task Initiation Late). it would be possibleto go
sufficiently far back in time and say that error was due toa late termination of the initial
descent phase which, in turn, was due to some distraction (further back in time)to which
the crew diverted resources to (and hence did not monitor the approach). Hence,we could
have hypothesized these situations and arrived at a Task Prioritization Incorrecterror
for most cases! However, since most of the narratives did not givea complete history of
events leading to the commission of specific errors, most of these probable Task
Prioritization Incorrect errors were not recorded. Perhapsa methodology to better
capture these subtle task prioritization errors could be devised with the help of ASRS.
Traffic watches proved to be a major distraction in causingcrews to concentrate on the
outside of the aircraft (54 of 122 Task Prioritization Incorrecterrors 44%). The "Other"
category (45 of 122 Task Prioritization Incorrect errors37%) comprised GPWS II
warnings, flight attendant entertainment and watching the othercrew member. Being61
engrossed in weather watches (23 of 122 Task Prioritization Incorrecterrors19%)
also resulted in almost all available resources being divertedto tasks of lower priority.
General Task Termination Errors
The general error category of task termination accounted for 23.5% of the three
error categories - 82 out of 349 errors. Of this the Task Termination Early category
accounted for 7% of task termination errors while the Task Termination Latecategory
and Task Termination Lack category accounted for 54% and 39% respectively.The
specific error categories for this segment and a brief discussion for each of thespecific
errors is given below.
Specific Task Termination Errors
Task Termination Early
The Task Termination Early error category was the smallest of the specific
error categories (6 out of 82 Task Termination Early errors7%). About 66% of
these involved the early release of the auto-pilot feature. The remaining 34% involved the
early termination of the check list (incomplete check list).
Task Termination Late
The Task Termination Late category (44 out of 82 Task Termination Late
errors - 53%) was the third largest specific error category, after Task Prioritization
Incorrect and Task Initiation Lack specific error categories. The majority of these
errors involved pilots overshooting the specific altitude clearance given by ATC (39 out of
44 Task Termination Late errors88%). For example, an aircraft cleared to 7000 feet
from 10,000 feet began the descent and continued descending past 7000 feet (initial goal)
before corrective action (either by alert crew members or ATC radar)was taken. The62
"Other" category (11% of Task Termination Late errors) included staying with coupled
approaches for too long and cases of extended downwind and/or base legs.
Task Termination Lack
The Task Termination Lack category (32 out of 82 Task Termination Lack
errors - 39%) involved mostly incidents of non-abortion of landings (23 out of 32 Task
Termination Lack errors-72%). Almost all of these involved landings by pilots inpoor
weather conditions (below FAA and company minima). In almostevery instance, the
pilots admitted to the error and stated that they would have gone around (GAR) fora
second approach if they were presented with the same situation again. Theseerrors were
so categorized after ascertaining that they were un-intentional i.e. the pilot flying (PF) was
un-aware that he was in violation of minimum weather rules. There were some instances
(5 occurrences in the 231 reports) of captains overriding their crew's warnings about
weather minima and going ahead with the landing. These were not recordedas CTM errors
but as violations (Reason, 1988). The other remaining error (6 out of 32 Task
Termination Lack errors- 19%) contributing to the Task Termination Lack category
involved pilots descending without arresting the descent at specified altitudes (by ATC) and
then proceeded to land resulting in un-authorized landings.63
6. CTM ERRORS AND HUMAN COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS
6.1CTM Errors and Cognitive Limitations
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to go into detail on the cognitiveaspects of
human behavior, some reference to it is made here (as they relate to CTM errors)so that
another researcher could explore the connection in some detail. In addition,an attempt was
made to identify some specific human cognitive limitation categories for the 231 incidents.
A brief summary of the main cognitive limitation categories that occurred with
greater frequency than the others (together with the specific phenomenon within the general
category) is presented below interspersed with an example of the specificerrors committed
in these categories.
Signal DetectionSignal detection is a wide field of study within the cognitive sciences
and deals with the detection of some environmental event that is sensed and processed by
the brain. Signal Detection Theory (SDT) attempts to distinguish between two discrete
states of the world called signal and noise. One aspect of signal detection, which is very
relevant to the study of pilot performance deals with vigilance decrement and vigilance loss.
These effects resulted from prolonged periods of monitoring duties that pilotswere often
engaged in and occurred frequently during instances of high workload, usually around
busy airports, in bad weather and during emergencies. The specific errors commonly
encountered in the incident narratives are described below.
Vigilance decrement Crews exhibited several instances of vigilance decrement
(losing track of headings, missing some ATC instructions,
instrument scan breakdown etc.) due to various reasons64
ranging from momentarily high workload situations, weather
and fatigue to even hunger.
Perception related problems in CTM incidents uncovered in thisresearch related to one
aspect of perceptual information processingholistic processing. Information processing
of incomplete "maps" of information (due to inattentionor any of the other perceptual
biases) resulted in sub-optimal outcomes. Some examples of theseare given below.
Holistic processing This occurred on almost all the instances wherethe crews
made the approaches to the wrong airfield. All thecases of
"aiming the aircraft at the wrong airfield" occurredwhere the
target airfield was in the vicinity of another with the net
result that crews aimed for thewrong one. Compounding
this was the tendency of crews to exhibit verisimilitude
(Reason, 1988) where they sought cues thatwere useful in
the past (if ATC clears for an approach viaa certain
intersection then this would result in a specific approachto a
specific runway) and launched themselveson these specific
approach patterns. Shutting down a good engine, intwo
incidents, involved this phenomenon where certain warnings
(e.g. over-temp alert) were associated with engine shut-
downs. In these cases the "whole picture"was missing in
the minds of the crews.
Decision Making errors in the incidents reviewedarose out of several causes. Chief of
these was a persistent tendency by somecrew members not to consider all the information
available relevant to the task before makinga decision (Ignoring sources of information).
In some cases crews made landing decisions inpoor weather while discounting all inputs
from fellow crew member and ATC. Someeven arrived at airfields with a firm conviction
of which runways were going to be assigned them. Landingsat wrong airports were,65
largely, the result of crews ignoring all the relevant instruments (usuallyfocusing on a
couple of instruments) or ignoring inputs of other crew members. The maincognitive
shortcomings in this category are identified below.
Ignoring sources of information
Equal weighting for all information sources
Overconfidence
Failure to consider all hypotheses
Confirmation bias
Poor decision making could be due toany one (or more) of
the several sub-categories listed above. Thesewere the main
ones listed which occurred in more than one CTM incident.
Of the 77 "other" category involving mistakes, slips,
violations and judgment, 11 were errors arising out ofpoor
decisions. Each of the 11 errors exhibited elements of
several of the sub-categories identified above. The
remaining 66 incidents did also revealmany instances of the
slips, violations and mistakes arising out of specificerrors in
this category. In fact, there was not a single instance, other
than in slips, in the remaining 66 incidents where theerror
committed (mistake or violation) was not due toone or
several of the specific categories identified above. The
tendency of captains (especially if they were flying withco-
pilots much junior or less experienced than themselves)to
exhibit overconfidence, to fail to consider all hypotheses,
exhibit bias against disconfirming evidence (dis-confirming
their initial diagnosis), to dismiss othersources of
information were readily evident in the 11 cases. The
reports were specific in identifying the captain's decision-
making actions. Confirmation bias errors appeared several
times when crews homed in on specific decisions and sought
cues to justify those decisions to the exclusion of other dis-
confirmatory evidence. One pilot set his altimeter wrongly
and arrived high while disputing with his co-pilot (untilvery66
late in the maneuver) that the instruments "sometimes play
up" and were unreliable in that particular vicinity and that the
approach was fine!
Memory limitations in the incidents reviewed relate mainly to short-term or working
memory limitations. Working memory is an attention-demanding, temporary store that we
use to retain new information until it is learned and stored in long-term memory.
Deficiencies specific to this area are discussed below.
Working memory persistence
Working memory capacity
Errors arising out of this phenomena included instances
where the pilot flying (PF) kept following previous ATC
clearances (since then updated). Many instances of working
memory capacity (short-ter memory) limitations were seen
where the crew could not maintain even partial lists of tasks
to execute (often forgetting them). These were particularly
evident in high-traffic airport vicinities and airports with
parallel runways (with crews having to maintain visual
separation of traffic outside the cockpit). In fact, it may turn
out that short-term memory limitation may be the main
category of cognitive limitation errors with all other
categories being subsets of it!
Attention and Perception problems are closely connected and these surfaced several
times in the incidents reviewed. Specifically they included one or more categories
identified below.
Inappropriate selection
Tendency to be distracted
Inability to divide attention
Stress-induced narrowing of attention channels67
Lag in modality switch
Parallel processing within a channel
This was another large category, elements of which occurred
with regular frequency in the incidents recorded. Stress-
induced narrowing of attention channels occurred in almost
every instance of an emergency and sometimes in high traffic
airport vicinity. Slow switching between modalitieswas
responsible for some task initiation late/lack errors (for
example, responding to a TCAS traffic alert (auditory) while
tracking an ILS approach (visual). Resolution Alerts (RA's)
were even more dramatic in their effect with a momentary lag
in crew response (while tracking the ILS) ;in some
instances the crew hesitated momentarily as if to confi rm the
RA before taking evasive action. There were several
instances of crews complaining of "false alerts by TCAS H".
Time-sharing or the process of attending to more than one task concurrently, varied
greatly among cockpit crews in the incidents reviewed. In general, time sharing
effectiveness is dependent on a number of factors including difficulty of the tasks, types of
modalities involved (conflicting or non-conflicting), and a number of other workload-
related factors. The more common manifestations of cognitive deficiencies in this category
are discussed below.
Resource limited performance
Individual differences in time-sharing ability
Decreased performance with increased workload
Some were better able to deal with the tasks (these were not
documented as no CTM errors were committed) while a
number of the 231 reports classified did involve some
failure, among crew members, to time-share effectively.
Emergencies, in general, appeared to result in poorer68
execution of multiple tasks. Weiner and Nagel (1988)
identify preparation as an important component that decides
effective response to stimuli. Hence, if the crew was
prepared for an emergency then it would be better equipped
to deal with multiple concurrent tasks than if it happened to
an unprepared crew. This appeared to be validated in at least
one situation where the pilot summarized the incident report
with the statement that "..such compound emergencies (the
crew had a fire and an explosion on board) did not occur in
our simulator sessions..".7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Conclusions
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The non-random nature of report submittals in the ASRS system has been alluded
to in the Section 2 and Section 4. These sampling characteristics made quantitative analysis
of the incident record difficult, resulting in a situation in which it is known thaterrors
occur, but without the corresponding ability to determine how often they occur (Nagel,
1988).
Nevertheless, this research has provided some valid and useful results. First, it has
confirmed that CTM errors were significant factors in a large number of incidents. In fact,
CTM errors occurred in 231 out of 470 ASRS incidents (49.2%). When this research
started, I looked at 260 ASRS incidents for CTM error classification; 109 of those incidents
(which included all phases of flightnot just the approach and landing phase) involved
CTM errors (42%). The consistency with which specific task management errors surfaced
in all the reports reviewed, suggested that there was a definite pattern to theerror
occurrences. Indeed, I have no reservations about extending these findings and predicting
the same CTM error rate to cover incidents that occurred but were not reported.
Second, it has assigned specific error categories and established the relative
proportionality that may be attributed to each type of CTM error. Three levels of
segmentation or layering of CTM error categories were established- the general CI M error
(e.g. Task Initiation), the specific level (e.g. Task Initiation Lack) and also a further
breakdown of the common errors inside this specific level (e.g. omitted tuning Navaidsor
specific radio frequencies on final approach).
Third, a structured method of error classification into the specific error categories
has been developed. This would enable future researchers to recognize and classify cum
errors in a consistent manner. In addition, this research has provided a basis on which70
more focused future analyses could be made into investigating the complex subject of
cockpit task management errors.
Based on the study of the 231 ASRS incident reports thatwere analyzed in detail, cockpit
crew errors in CTM could be summarized as follows:
1)Task Initiation Early errors involved mostly early descents (80%of all Task
Initiation Early errors).
2)Task Initiation Late errors comprised largely late configuration ofaircraft (83%
of all Task Initiation Late errors).
3)Task Initiation Lack errors involved mostly the failureto tune navigational aids
and radios to the correct frequencies (77% of all Task Initiation Lackerrors).
4)Task Prioritization Incorrect errors werea direct result of three major
distractionsa traffic watch (44% of all Task Prioritization Incorrect errors)
and a weather watch (19% of all Task Prioritization Incorrect errors).The
other major category (37% of all Task Prioritization Incorrect errors)resulting
in incorrect prioritization errors wasmore diffused and due to crew confusion during
TCAS II alerts, pilot-not-flying (PNF) watching pilot flying's (PF) performanceto
the exclusion of their own duties, entertaining flight attendantsetc.
5)Task Termination Early errors were few in number (7% of all Task
Termination Early errors) and involved mostlycrews dis-engaging the auto-pilot
too early .
6)Task Termination Late errors involved altitude overshoots (89% of all Task
Termination Late errors) and involved mostly altitude overshoots. ATC
clearances to specific altitudes resulted in crews arresting their descent after thetarget
altitude (the goal) had been achieved.
7)Task Termination Lack errors consisted largely ofcrews electing to make a
landing (wrong choice) instead of aborting the landing and makinga second approach
or diverting to the alternate (72% of all Task Termination Lack errors).71
7.2Other Non-CTM Errors
While these errors were not listed under any of the CUMerror categories, they
deserve some mention as they were also central to the variouserror occurrences in the other
CTM error categories.
Mistakes, slips, violations and judgmental (decision-making)errors were defined
earlier in Section 3. There were compelling reasons to include themas an adjunct to the
CTM error taxonomy since their mitigation paralleled the remedies for CTMerrors. In any
case, these errors have to be addressed in some manner, possibly as an integral part ofa
cockpit crew training curriculum. Their frequency ofoccurrence in the 470 reports that
were original analyzed is given in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2Error rate for Mistakes, Slips, Violations and Judgment (in 470
incidents)
Error Category Frequency of Occurrence
Mistakes 51
Judgment 11
Violations 9
Slips _6
Total 77
7.3 Recommendations
The results of this research have implications thatare largely training-based as
opposed to design-based. Reason (1988) suggested that themost productive strategy for
dealing with active errors was to focus on controlling theirconsequences rather than upon
striving for their elimination. The aim in CTM error mitigation should beto have a72
structured method of reducing or eliminating theseerrors. Reason (1988) once again
suggested that if the pilot errors were truly stochastic in nature then the focusshould be on
a reduction of this variability.
The following guidelines are presentedas a means to mitigate CTM errors. A
number of these suggestions had already been proposed by Chou (1991),Funk (1991),
Reason (1988) and Wiener and Curry (1980).
1) Provide comprehensive crew education (at all stages of flying career)in
CTM errors and associated cognitive limitations.
Besides electronic aiding to reduce mental workload of pilots,crew
training has to emphasize that Cockpit Task Management (CTM) isa valid
concept that could be easily integrated into existing Cockpit Resource
Management (CRM) programs. The current practice of assigning CRM
training at the end of simulator training sessions (indeed, the last itembefore
crew departure) implies that management's attitude towards it is something
other than a priority item. The crew, consequently, endsup treating CRM
as an adjunct to the primary task or as another "company policy
requirement" to satisfy. CTM training would have to be introducedas the
focus of on-going crew training efforts if it is not to suffer thesame fate as
current CRM programs. CTM relies on the education of the professional
pilot rather than the training skills he/she must acquire (CRM providesthis).
The current training efforts of most airlines concentrateon the latter with
little attention given to the former. The distinction isan important one; the
training has to be complemented by a sufficient amount of theattendant
education in crew training efforts of airlines. In particular, ifcrews could
be made aware of human cognitive limitations and CTMerrors that could
result as a consequence, they would be better equippedto deal with the73
situations as they arise.In the research, there were two incidents involving
pilots arriving "half a dot low" on the GS (Glide Slope)" which they
ascribed to pilots newly transitioning to wide-body aircraft. Such "memory
lags" (physical body in the new plane but the brain in the old one)may be
addressed by an exposure of the crew to cognitive limitationprocesses.
2) Provide structured crew training (at all stages of flying career) that optimizes
training resources and pilot learning abilities.
The current methods of crew training rely heavily on getting pilots
through the simulator sessions as quickly as possible. The traditional
approach by airlines in conversion or re-currency training has beento bring
a group of their pilots (drawn from operations in the US and abroad) to their
simulators and cycle them out within three days. During that time, the pilots
are introduced to a new aircraft they will be upgrading to (for those on
conversion training) and which will require almost all of their attention to
"fly it" to acceptable performance limits. Besides also learning to fly, they
will have to understand the aircraft's limitations and its control systems
theory. At the close of the simulator and theory sessions the pilotsare
introduced to CRM concepts! This is a considerable amount to digest ina
couple of days before the line-oriented-flight-training (LOFT) exercises.
This is done by the airlines in the interests of economy. CTM concepts
could be introduced, instead, at this stage with a structured program that
staggers the simulator, LOFT and CTM and CRM sessions such that
optimal learning is achieved which would impact flight safety. It is
recommended that simulator and LOFT sessions be staggered such that the
two day simulator sessions become a simulator/CTM and CRM session
followed by a LOFT/CTM and CRM session followed by a Simulator/CTM74
and CRM session and then a LOFT/CTM and CRM session.At the very
least, all existing CRM training sessions should havea strong CTM
component emphasizing the associated task managementerrors.
While this procedure may be expensive, dueto having crews come
in on several occasions, it has the potential of improvingcrew performance
and thus reducing error rates. Indeed,one major airline in the US, which
has changed its crew training policy recently, has reporteda remarkable rate
of success with its new program which followsa similar philosophy.
3) All training sessions (simulators and LOFT) should emphasizesafety
preparedness as the basis for all CTM (and other) exercises,
Airlines should strive to removepressures on flightcrews to keep
aircraft on tight schedules. Therewere a number of CTM errors as well as
violations of procedures where captains electedto ignore crew inputs and
land their aircraft in marginal weather conditions. Safearrivals, not early
arrivals, should be the emphasis in all flying training. In thecase of aircraft
emergencies necessitating a landing at the alternate airport, thecrews need to
be aware that the alternate runway should be ratedto carry the weight of
their particular aircraft. This problem occurred several timeswhen the
crews of aircraft diverted to the alternate only to find that they had exceeded
the weight capacity of the runway, which led to their aircraftbeing denied
take-off clearance pending inspection by the FAA. Thecrews were too pre-
occupied with their respective emergencies that they forgotto check this
vital information on the alternate airfield. Inextreme cases (and there were a
few of these) crews did not even have sufficient informationon alternate
runways with at least one that did not have the approach plates at all for the
alternate. Many pilots identified TCAS II alerts (real and false)as potential75
sources of distraction on approach. Incorporating TCAS II alerts in
simulators during the approach to land phase therefore (rarely done, if at all
now) should help in getting crews to be comfortable operating in multiple
emergency situations. Get crews to read back clearances more often and
always confirm runway clearances; for example, if an aircraft is on vectors,
ask specifically, " Confirm vectored for 24L"? This requires a definite
response from ATC. In an emergency, crews should not waste time and
energy with a VFR approach; unless flying conditions prove otherwise,
crews should always ask for vectors. This is especially important for a
two-man cockpit crew team.
4) Provide cockpit crew with a continuous assessment of task status and
its priority in the agenda and also allocate system resources accordingly.
Task prioritization errors were central to the error occurrences in the
other categories. Although this is borne out by the slightly higher incidence
rate of task prioritization errors (122 out of 349 errors), the number belies
its actual significance. Task prioritization errors occurred with every
situation that were identified by the pilots as high workload situations.
Where the workload situation was not identified, there were a number of
consequential errors committed as a result of failure to prioritize tasks.
Emergencies in particular (explosion, engine failure, etc.) caused crews to
forget to initiate certain tasks (even forgetting to declare an emergency!). A
fully integrated Cockpit Task Management System (CTMS) would help
pilots walk through the particular emergency in a systematic manner without
any task omissions. An integrated CTMS will have emergency procedures
(engine failure, shut-down procedures, relight procedures, fire, explosion,
etc.) programmed into it. These could be invoked with a single push of a76
button. A hierarchical menu system is envisaged where thefirst recall
would result in a screen showinga choice of emergencies (fire on board or
an engine fire, engine failure or an explosion, say). The second recall(the
crew having made the selectionengine failure, say) would result ina
second screen showing engine shut down procedures which,having been
initiated by the crew and verified thus by the CTMS,would result in an
engine relight procedure screen. Each of these layeredscreens would walk
the crew through the necessary steps toensure that no tasks were omitted in
dealing with the emergency. The EICASsystem, now appearing on some
of the newer aircraft, is a step in this direction. Theintegrated CTMS
would also have a system to monitor flightprogress (crew punches in Initial
Descent, Final Approach etc., say) and thesystem would recognize that
certain activities (such as lowering of flapsat higher than approach speeds)
would result in a non-obtrusive but positive warning.In one of the
incidents the aircrew was 500 feet from touch downwhen they realized that
they had forgotten to deploy the landinggear.
Having thus established the priority of tasksto be executed in
sequence, resources have to be allocated for the execution of these tasks.
The captain would allocate responsibilities toexecute these tasks to other
crew members and the CTMS would serve only as a monitor for which each
task's completion would be checked-off (crew memberconfirms execution
by pressing button on flagged items). Any tasks remainingwould also be
flagged (aural or visual or both) for the crew's attention.Tasks that had
been suspended by unexpected conditions could also bedisplayed by the
CTMS and such tasks that might need resumption wouldbe automatically
re-prioritized in the context of the thencurrent condition. For example, if
the crew had been asked to contact Tower frequency(for a "delayed hand-77
off' by Approach Control- a very common occurrence and gripe, of pilots)
on an ILS approach when they contacted patchy fog (high crew
concentration), then the CTMS would remind them of the needto contact
tower for landing clearance. There were 27 such incidents of failureto
contact tower for landing clearance resulting in un-authorized landings.
5) Provide a holistic view of the aircraft state (system state) andits relation to
the outside world (world state) to the pilot.
There were numerous instances in the reports of pilots losing their
bearings where the aircraft was in relation to the destinationairport, where
in the flight pattern (on final approach) the aircraftwas in relation to the
runway or where the aircraft was in relation to other nearby traffic (in the
vicinity of high-traffic airports). Inmany of these instances, crews thought
that they were already at specific waypoints when they hadnot arrived there
and errors were committed in early descents and early terminationof tasks.
Chou (1991) identified instances wherecrew members initiated engine
recovery procedures (when they were too high) without any reference to the
re-start envelope. A dynamic computerized support system that
systematically updates information on the aircraft state and worldstate could
also double as an inter-active electronic check list. The aircraftsystem state
and its relation to the world could be presented to the pilot with automatic
countdown of check list items that should be actioned at eachstage. The
check list would flag items (aural or visual warnings) thatwere incomplete.
This would circumvent almost all of the early descenterrors (Task
Initiation Early) and the late configurationerrors (Task Initiation
Late) while the radio/navaid tuningerrors (Task Initiation Lack) errors
would be greatly reduced.78
6) Provide training to Air Traffic Controllers in CTM and CRMconcepts
ATC problems, as reported by pilots often referred to the "delayed
hand-off' procedure as a major source of problem. Pilotson approach were
usually asked to contact tower frequency for thenecessary landing clearance
but after they had arrived at the Outer Marker (usually). In the ensuing high
workload situation on short finals, pilots often forgot to switchto tower
resulting in un-authorized landings. Compliance with "un-doable"
clearances, issued by ATC, and changing clearances at short notice (on
finals) by ATC were also a common gripe with pilots. In several of the
incidents, tower control was issuing instructions to pilotson roll-outs. In
addition, pilots often complained that ATC sometimes didnot listen to read
backs (by pilots) of clearances resulting in mis-interpreted clearances and
consequential errors. All these problems indicateda serious lack of
teamwork on the part of the major players. The Air Traffic Controller isan
important and integral member of the aviation trinity comprising the pilots
(and airlines), the regulatory bodies (the FAA and the NTSB) and the ATC.
Automation such as the Voice Data Link (VDL) systemmay only partially
mitigate some of the communication problems between ATC and pilots.
Until a serious attempt is made to integrate the efforts of all thesegroups to
help one another as team members (and they all rely on each other for their
own existence) rather than treat each other as adversaries, little progress is
going to be made in resolving the CTM error rate. Hence, it is
recommended that ATC personnel be able to attend CTM and CRM training
sessions and this should be coordinated/facilitated by the regulatory bodies
(in a supportive role) and supported by all the airlines.79
As the present research got underway, it appeared as if all the errors committed by
the flightcrew could be traced, eventually, to some shortcoming in human cognitive
abilities. It is therefore recommended that the connection between CTM errors and human
cognitive limitations be investigated in earnest. In addition, the special category of
mistakes, slips, violations and judgmental errors should be analyzed in some detail since
there appears to be a case for including them as a sub-set of the CTM error umbrella. The
consequences of errors in this category have a direct impact on CTM errors; certainly, the
remedies to mitigate errors in this category parallel those classified under the CTM
category. Perhaps an adjunct category to the CTM error categories could be devised to
accommodate this category of errors.80
REFERENCES
Aviation Safety Reporting System. (1993, Feb). Specialrequest NO. 2843, "Approach
and landing phase incidents" [Database search]. ASRS office, MountainView,
California: Battelle.
Bar lay, S. (1990). The Final call: Why aviation disasters continueto happen. N.Y.
Pantheon Books.
Billings, C. E. (1981). Information transfer problems in the aviationsystem. NASA
Technical Paper 1875.
Billings, C. E., and Reynard, W. D. (1984). Human factors in aircraft incidents:
Results of a 7- year study.Aviation. Space, and Environmental Medicine,
pp. 960-965.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company. (1992). Statisticalsummary of commercial jet
aircraft accidents. worldwide operations1959-1990.
Card, S., Moran, T., & Newall, A. (1983). The psychology of human-computer
interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Chambers, A. B., Nagel, D.C. (1985). Pilots of the future: Humanor computer?
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, 28, 1187-1199.
Chou, C. D. (1991). Cockpit task managementerrors: A design issue for intelligent
pilot-vehicle interfaces. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Oregon State University,
Corvallis, OR.
Chou, C. D., and Funk, K. (1990, November). Management of multiple tasks:Cockpit
Task Management errors.Proceedings of the 1990 IEEE International Conference
on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics, Los Angeles, CA.
Crouch, J. M., (1992). An ounce of application is wortha ton of abstraction. Leads
corporation. Greensboro. NC.
Curry, R. E. (1985). The introduction of new cockpit technology: A humanfactors
study, (NASA Technical Memo 86659). Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames
Research Center.81
Funk, K. (1991). Cockpit Task Management: Preliminary definitions, normative theory.
error taxonomy, and design recommendations. Department of Industrial and
Manufacturing Engineering, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon.
Lauber, J. K., (1986). Cockpit resource management training: background and
overview. In H. W. Or lady & H. C. Foushee (Eds.), Cockpitresource
management training (NASA conference publication 2455. pp. 5-14). Moffett
field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
Madhavan, D. and Funk, K. (1993). Cockpit Task Management: An ASRS incident
study. Poster presentation at the Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society 37th annual meeting. Seattle, WA.
Nagel, D. C. (1988). Human error in aviation operations.In Weiner, E. L., and Nagel,
D. C. (Eds.), Human Factors in Aviation, San Diego: Academic Press.
Norman, D. A. (1981).Categorization of action slips.Psychological Review,
Number 1.
O'Hare, D., and Roscoe, S. (1990). Flight deck performance: The human factor.
Ames: Iowa State University
Parasuraman, R. (1987). Human-computer monitoring. Human Factors, 29 (6),
pp. 695-706.
Rasmussen, J. (1983). Skills, rules, knowledge; signals, signs and symbols; and other
distinctions in human performance models. IEEE Transactionson Systems. Mans
and Cybernetics. SMC 13 (3).
Rasmussen, J. (1985). Trends in human reliability analysis. Ergonomics, Vol. 28, No.
8, 1185-1195
Reason, J. (1990). Human error, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Rehman, J. T., Stein, E. S., & Rosenberg, B. L. (1983).Subjective pilot workload
assessment. Human Factors, 25, 297-307.
Rouse, W. B (1981). "Human-Computer interaction in the control of dynamic systems."
Computer Surveys, Vol. 13, No.1, 71-99. March 1981.82
Rouse, W. B., and Rouse, S. H. (1983). Analysis and classification of humanerror.
IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC 13,
pp. 539-549.
Ruffel-Smith, H. P. (1979). A simulator study of the interaction of pilotworkload with
errors. vigilance. and decisions. (NASA technical memo 78472). Moffett Field,
CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
Sears, R.L. (1986). A new look at accident contributions and the implicationsof
operational and training procedures. Unpublished report. Boeing Commercial
Airplane Company.
Weiner, E. L., (1985), Beyond the sterile cockpit. Human Factors,27(1),75-90.
Weiner, E. L., (1987 a).fallible humans and vulnerable systems: Lessons learned from
aviation. In Wise, J. A. and Debons, A., Informatuion System:Failure
Analysis.Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Weiner, E. L., and Curry, R. E. (1980). Flight-deck automation: promises andproblems.
Ergonomics, Vol. 23 (10), 995-1011.
Wickens, C. D., and Flach, J. M. (1988).Information Processing. In Weiner, E. L.,
and Nagel, D. C. (Eds.),.Human Factors in Aviation, San Diego: Academic
Press.AppendicesAppendix I
Summary of CTM errors in 231 ASRS incidentreports
CTM Error
Category Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
ASRS
Report # Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
191956
192018
192660
192798
192808
196716
197269
197363
197423
197432
197525
197777
198394
198398
199191 4to
199285
199526 41)
199964 41
200203
201415CTM Error
Category
ASKS
Report #
Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
Early Late Lack Incorrect Early I ale Lack
201857
201970
202129
202233
202324
202340
202666
202788
202948
203110
203313
203352
203357 41.
203531
203587
203692
203839
203926
204174
204739
4CTM Error
Category Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
ASKS
Report # Early I Ate Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
204919
205273
206310
207846
207957
209614
209795
209868
210234 gio
210434
210692
210716
210807
210904
210912
212660
213286
215707
216066
216283CTM Error
Category Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
ASRS
Report # Early I ate Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
216617
217129
217430
217784
218661
221662
221762
223200
223672
224139
224197 I
224500 --,
228154
228824
228827
197423
90732
112867
119472
133899CTM Error
Category Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
ASKS
Report # Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
137705
144766
153049
156654
159689
165425
171669
192660
194905
196627
201642
202159
202324
202642
204883
216902
222508
224472
228696
.
229152 obCTM Error
Category
ASKS
Report #
Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
193460
193521
193828
193848
194098
194435
194664
195498
196103
196447 ito
196736
197311
197431
197819
198777
200978 olo
201848
202238
202390
202771CTM Error
Category Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
ASKS
Report # Early I .31..e. Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
202948 ito
203086
203467
203586
203659
204512
204531
204823
224359
206005
211425
212551
213428
215437
216140
216228
219832
219847
221135
224236CTM Error
Category
ASKS
Report #
Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
225374
225831
226068 ii
228441
228445
198358
50006
50664
57612
58070
54096
53936
53261
4.
61384
163962
68569
41,
127358 .
104260
169789
153202
0CTM Error
Category
ASKS
Report #
Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
149672
98235
70731
113070
82787
90126
142367
132717
129262
129253
118461
82995
163284
163791
50669
127456
100133
94508
95266 ii
109856CTM Error
Category Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination ASKS
Report # Early I -ate Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
124168
127348
88595
92181
122545
61384
135085
167166
78665
72600
71374
71668
169584
169351
dio
101423
102576
102493
103556
103473
103272 oiCTM Error
Category
ASRS
Report #
Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Late Lack
102966 oi
105151 as
105528
105511
105869
110576
105824
114086
162286
162203
155069
154405
166507
120217
132120
115787
114421 Al
62638
64961
66976CTM Error
Category
ASKS
Report #
Task Initiation Task Prioritization Task Termination
Early Late Lack Incorrect Early Iate Lack
70419
132112
132100
133889
136878
136799
137204
149158
147891
153390
gio
154249
Total 35 24 86 122 6 44 32ADF
ASRS
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Appendix II
Glossary of Aviation Terminology
Automatic direction finder. A navigation aid that
indicates the direction to a non-directional radio
transmitter from which signals are being received
Aviation Safety Reporting System. A reporting service for
airman, ATC, maintenance personnel and others toreport
actual or potential hazards to air safety. It isa voluntary
and anonymous reporting service.
ATC Air Traffic Control
Capt. Captain
CAT III Airport is equipped with an Automatic landing system.
LANDING SYSTEM
CAVU Ceiling and visibility unlimited.
CB Cumulo nimbus. Thunderstorm clouds.
CIRCUIT The rectangular flight path around the airport comprising
the take-off, cross-wind leg, the downwind leg, the base leg
and finals for landing.
CRM Cockpit Resource Management.
CTM Cockpit Task Management
EICAS Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration96
FLARE To round out a landing approach to touch down smoothly
by gradually raising the nose of the aircraft.
F/O First Officer. Second in command after the Captain.
GLASS COCKPIT
GLIDE SLOPE (GS)
GPWS
A generic term used in reference to a flightdeck
instruments that display information via electronic
means rather than the traditional electromechanical
devices. Most of these are computer displays.
A radio beam transmitted by an instrument landing
system that defines a desired glidepathnormally inclined
three degrees with deviations above and below the desired
glidepath within + 0.5 degrees (or 1/2 dot spacing).
Ground proximity warning system. A warning deviceon
the flight deck that is activated when the rate of closure
with terrain or departure from the GS is outside
prescribed limits.
IMC Instrument meteorological conditions. Flying with
reference to instruments only.
ILS Instrument landing system. A pilot interpreted radio
navigation aid providing vertical (glideslope) and lateral
(localizer) angular displacement froma final approach
path to a runway.
LOFT Line oriented flight training.
MDA Minimum descent altitude. The lowest altitude to which
descent is authorized without visual contact with the
runway in a non-ILS approach.
NDB Non directional beacon that emits a continuous radio
wave, the directional origin of which can be sensed by an
ADF to guide the aircraft to a fixed position.NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OVERSHOOT
R V R
TCAS II
VFR
VOR
97
landing past the intended touchdown point, execution of
a missed approach or the exceedence of a specific ATC
altitude clearance by the aircraft.
Runway visual range. The minimum length ofrunway
that can be seen with the naked eye. Used in making
decisions in executing missed approaches.
Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System. Givestwo
main signals, the traffic alert (TA) when too close to
traffic and the resolution alert (RA) to take immediate
evasive action.
Visual flight rules. The regulations governing flight
operations when the weather conditions are ator above a
certain minima.
Visual omni range. An omni directional radio (more
sophisticated than an NDB) that provides indications of
the bearing of the aircraft to or from the ground
transmitter.
W X Weather